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This study analyses the urban planning efforts of the 
government for an explanation of some unintended outcomes.  
A popular perception is that development in Thimphu city 
could do with better planning. On the contrary, there have 
been extensive efforts from both the Thimphu Thromde and 
MoWHS to control land use and regulate building design 
through policies like the Thimphu Structure Plan 2003-27 and 
its attached Development Control Regulations 2004. The 
question driving the research is to explain why despite the 
rules in place, planning goals are not achieved. The study 
identifies why and how actors avoid compliance to the original 
planning codes.  
 
It is observed that the implementation process has been 
extremely slow and even after ten years, only six (of the first 
set of twelve) Local Area Plans (LAPs) have been implemented. 
This is mainly due to a lengthy process of land readjustment 
prolonged by limited organizational capacity, faulty cadastral 
information and some resistant landowners. In areas where 
the LAPs have been implemented, deviations are already 
evident by reduced share of planned public spaces (e.g. 
neighbourhood servicing node in Babesa). Authorization of 
deviations on a case by case basis accumulated towards an 
overall level of denser development.  
 
Although the plan wanted to balance development with 
nature, traditional architecture and affordable housing, it has 
aggravated imbalances on all three parameters. Plan 
implementation proceeded in a way that community & green 
spaces diminished and private buildings came up in areas not 
reserved for development.To explain these rule deviation, it is 
argued that implementation was a highly individualized 
process of negotiation between the municipality and property 
 x 
 
owners. The predominant mechanism for non-compliance is 
legal authorization of deviations either by a government 
order/letter or by rule revision. 
 
The study is relevant for governments and international 
development partners for understanding policy 
implementation failures. It provides real illustrations of 
organizational issues in a rapidly growing bureaucracy and 
how multiplicity of authorities weakened the authority of the 




Last year in June, the flash floods of north India swept over 
entire towns like Kedarnath, endangering the life of over 
100,000 residents and pilgrims (Sati 2013). The immediate 
cause was attributed to a cloud burst but precipitation excess 
of 400 mm isn't unprecedented in the Himalayan region; in 
1965, Uttarakhand received as much as 900m rainfall in a 
single day (Bidwai 2013). Environmentalists have argued that 
the 2013 cloudburst would not have become a disaster of 
such magnitude had the state government complied with 
India‟s Environment and Forest Ministry to ban construction 
in the river banks (The Guardian).  To quote Dr. Sunita 
Narain, Director General of the Centre for Science and 
Environment  
 
This is very much a man-made disaster… exacerbated 
by the reckless construction of buildings, dams and 
roads in a fragile environment. Many of the 
settlements have been built right next to the rivers in 
blatant violation of environmental laws. There is a 
strong need to evolve a holistic Himalayan policy 
which will deal with all these issues (Sehgal 2013).  
 
Unlike Himalayan countries like India and Nepal which have 
been complacent to regulate urban sprawl in their ecologically 
sensitive hill towns, the tiny kingdom of Bhutan has paid 
strong policy attention to temper the speed of development. 
Bhutan is famous for its “High Value Low Impact”1 tourism 
policy which regulates the inflow of tourists through a daily 
tariff of up to $250/day. While regulation of the tourism 
industry is presently sustained by the economic interests of a 
                                              
1 Tourism Council of Bhutan http://www.tourism.gov.bt/about-
tcb/about-tcb 
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lobby of tour operators2, the policy was initially proposed to 
restrict the volume of visitors in Bhutan. For a country with a 
population of not even a million, this was probably seen as a 
measure to check both environmental and “cultural 
pollution”3. Bhutan‟s tourism policy is an expression of its 
“happiness” ideology which emphasizes that economic growth 
should not be pursued at the expense of Bhutan‟s 
environment and culture. The origins of this ideology go back 
to a UN conference in the 1970s when His Majesty, the fourth 
king, surprised the world by saying that Gross National 
Happiness is more important for Bhutan than the pursuit of 
Gross Domestic Product (Ahmad 2013). Over the years, the 
meaning and form of GNH has evolved and today it has been 
institutionalized by Bhutan‟s planning commission in the 
form of a policy screening tool to ensure all new policies are 
GNH compatible. Given this context, it is not surprising that 
the Bhutanese government has been concerned about the 
ecological and cultural impacts of urbanization such as the 
disappearance of traditional forms of architecture. These 
concerns are quite aptly reflected in the plan for the capital 
city, the Thimphu Structure Plan (TSP) 2003-2027.    
1.1 Thimphu 2027: A Dream City 
The Thimphu Structure Plan is a 25 year plan for Thimphu. It 
envisages Thimphu as a “dream city” by 2027 which would 
provide residents adequate space to work, drive, jog, cycle, 
picnic, relax and be close to nature (Gyeltshen 2002b). In its 
preamble, the plan cites the alarming examples of Indian hill 
towns like Darjeeling, Gangtok and Srinagar which have 
transformed from “serene hill station resorts” into “chaotic 
bazaar  towns” (MoWHS 2004:2).  It argues that Thimphu 
would meet the same fate unless efforts are made to plan its 
                                              
2 Discussions in Better Business Summit, Thimphu: Workshop 1: 
Making Business Easy, March 27, 2014 




urbanization. It finds that with a population of 43,4794 in 
2000, Thimphu was already home to a third of Bhutan‟s 
urban population. As early as 2003, the plan complained that  
 
The city is already facing housing shortages, traffic 
congestion, air pollution and chaotic building 
patterns. The forests, which preside over the city, are 
being encroached upon. Orchards in the ecologically 
fragile areas are being irrationally sub-divided, 
without reference to the carrying capacity of the land 
(MoWHS 2004: 2). 
 
As a solution, the plan proposes to guide Thimphu‟s planning 
by a set of principles which it calls “Intelligent Urbanism” 
(MoWHS 2004: 3)  
 
…What is essential to allay this disaster is a 
common set of principles, which all agree upon and 
all act by. 
 
Intelligent Urbanism, the plan‟s guiding philosophy, is 
proposed by Harvard-trained and Pune-based Christopher 
Charles Benninger whose firm was contracted to prepare the 
plan in June 2001. Mr. Benninger had worked in Bhutan as a 
consultant on UN projects in 1979 and was well known to 
royal government officials. The plan acknowledges the 
influence of architects such as Lewis  Mumford,  Jose Luis 
Sert, Constantine Doxiadis, Team Ten, and the expansions of 
their concepts by the New Urbanist and Smart Growth groups 
in America (MoWHS 2004: 3). Due to this influence, the plan 
places great emphasis on making Thimphu a walkable city. 
The New Urbanism school of planning, which inspires the 
                                              
4 This figure excludes the floating population in the city as well as 
Institutions like Embassies, IMTRAT, DANTAK, RBA, RBG (MoWHS 
2004: 2).  
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TSP, incorporates elements of mixed-used space as opposed 
to orthodox planning which advocates zoning5. The TSP 
divides the city into dense compact neighbourhoods or 16 
“Urban Villages” which serve as the basic unit of planning 
rather than the typical administrative ward (See Annex). Each 
Urban Village is primarily residential but is serviced by its 
own “Neighbourhood Node” which offers all facilities at 
walking distance like shopping stores, ATMs and also a 
business centre with offices (MoWHS 2004: 90). The 
Neighbourhood Node also doubles up as a nodal point in the 
city transport network as the bus stop is planned here. 
Moreover, it forms the linkage between apartments and the 
city-wide footpath which crosses through green areas and is 
intertwined with heritage walks and river promenades. 
 
The plan, which is based on several months of data collection 
on the city‟s topography, land use and density, estimates that 
Thimphu would have a population of 1,62,327 by 2027. This 
is appearing to be an underestimate as Thimphu‟s population 
is already reaching 1,30,000. To accommodate the growing 
numbers, TSP proposes a strategy of densification through 
both vertical and horizontal infilling (MoWHS 2004: 214) 
while retaining a significant area of the city as green land 
(MoWHS 2004: 13). In 1999, the boundaries of Thimphu 
municipality were extended from an area of 8 sq km to 26 sq 
km (Dorji 1999). One of the main purposes of the TSP was to 
bring municipal services to extended areas in a planned 
manner. This was to be achieved through the “Precinct Plan” 
which is based on land use and guides building regulations. 
For example, ecologically sensitive areas like steep slopes and 
river banks which are prone to erosion are categorized under 
“Environmental Conservation Precinct” where no building 
                                              
5 Although critics of orthodox planning like Jane Jacobs would argue 





activity is allowed. Based on the “Forest and Conservation 
Act, 1995”, the plan does not allow construction within 30 
metres on either side of the Wang Chhu river and major 
streams (MoWHS 2004: 96). This 30 metre river buffer is thus 
as a zero-density precinct. The “Development Control 
Regulations” (DCR) 2004, which is an addendum to the TSP, 
coordinates permissible building activity with the Precinct 
Plan in a way that zero or low density precincts have lower 
building heights compared to higher density precincts. As the 
Precinct Plan serves to protect the environment, it also serves 
to protect national heritage. For example, land around the 
Tashichho Dzong is categorized as a low density precinct to 
maintain a sanctity buffer around the Dzong. The plan 
compiled a comprehensive inventory of heritage structures 
and sites of religious importance that should be preserved. 
Similarly, old settlements in Zilukha, Dechencholing, Chang 
Jiji, and Babesa were categorized under the “Traditional 
Village Precinct” so that structures in traditional architecture 
form would not be replaced by modern buildings. When a 
building permit application is submitted to the Thimphu City 
Corporation, the municipal authorities refer to the area‟s 
Precinct category in order to determine permissible building 
construction. In this way, the Precinct Plan serves as a guide 
for the DCR as building heights vary with precinct densities. 
 
The TSP is thus a clear articulation of Bhutan‟s GNH 
principles into policy. To get a sense of plan outcomes, we 
now fast forward by a decade from planning for Thimphu in 
2003 to what Thimphu looks today in 2014. The next section 
shows that despite so much foresight, instituting the plan 
could not guarantee outcomes.  
1.2 Thimphu today: Paradoxes of planning 
The present status of planning in the extended areas is that 
most LAPs have been approved but infrastructure provision 
Thimphu’s Growing Pains 
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has not kicked off everywhere, especially where infrastructure 
funding is not readily available. While slow implementation 
with some success has been one result, there have also been 
some unintended outcomes, three of which are presented 
below. 
Loss of green areas 
The plan accelerated development in the peripheries both 
outside and inside the municipal area. Outside, it activated 
incentives for development without taking any preventive 
measures. It did not institute any mechanism (e.g. urban 
growth boundary) to keep developments outside the 
municipal area in check. Inside, it legitimized construction on 
paddy fields through the tool of Local Area Planning. We see 
that the pressure to build on spaces allocated for open and 
green areas in the extended areas continues to grow. The 
result is urbanization of paddy fields from Babesa in the 
south to Kabesa in the north. 
Inside the boundary: Babesa 
According to the Director General of the Department of Urban 
Development and Housing (DUDH), 70% of the new municipal 
areas would be kept as open and green areas (Gyeltshen 
2002b). If we look at Babesa today, the numbers don‟t quite. 
Less than 7% of the Neighbourhood Node precinct remains 





Urbanization of Babesa village 
 
Outside the boundary: Kabesa 
The concept of urban boundary holds little meaning in 
Thimphu. In fact, building regulations only get more lax as 
one gets out of the municipal boundary. The following picture 
captures real estate housing projects in the north outgrowth 
of Thimphu, beyond the municipal boundary which ends at 
Pangri Zampa monastery.  
 




Urbanization spreads outside Thimphu‟s northern boundary 
Disappearance of traditional architecture 
In 2002, when the Kuensel started to report on the TSP and 
its grand vision for the city, it was said that the city‟s 
traditional and cultural heritage would be kept intact. A 





All new buildings will be required to incorporate the 
elements of traditional architecture. We will now be 
more vigorous and firm in implementing this rule 
which was often violated in the past (Gyeltshen 
2002b). 
 
It is true that places like Changangkha, Tashichhodzong and 
Dechenphodrang have been protected as Heritage precincts. 
It is also true that monitoring of the building permit has 
become more stringent. Despite this effort, it could be argued 
that rather than preserving traditional architecture of 
residential buildings, the plan has diluted it. This is because 
alongside the building rules, the plan also promoted a 
densification strategy and increased permissible building 
heights up to six floors. Traditional architecture guidelines 
have therefore been adapted from the rural to the urban 
context. In this process of translation, many of the traditional 
features have been diluted. As a result, the urban form 
retains symbolic but not functional aspects of Bhutan‟s 
traditional architectural practices.  
 
Traditionally in Bhutan, a community would pool in their 
labour and a master carpenter would perform the role of the 
architect. Because building was a craft, every house had a 
unique form and shape. However, the new buildings in 
Thimphu are all standardized and look the same, as evident 
by the “Babesa Boxes”. They lack the character of a 
traditional Bhutanese house precisely because of processes of 
“state simplification”6 which have heavily institutionalized the 
building permit application process. Although with good 
intentions, the plan has created a regimented routine for each 
application to go through a series of approvals (architectural, 
structural, electrical, sewage, site plan and so on). The master 
carpenter who was a wealth of experience and knowledge has 
                                              
6Scott 1998: 3 
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been replaced by young architects in the municipality. Their 
concern is not to handcraft each structure but to meet the 
checklist in the 40 page document on Traditional Architecture 
Guidelines. Because the state was so worried about losing 
traditional architecture, it tightened its hold over building 
regulations and in the process standardized the process as 
well as form of buildings.  
 
 
Traditional structure in a background of new buildings 
in Babesa 





Lack of affordable housing 
Last year in June, a World Bank sponsored conference was 
hosted in Thimphu on “Promoting Access to Affordable Land 
and Housing” (The World Bank 2013) where policy makers 
discussed this challenge for South Asia including Thimphu. 
Compared to its giant counterparts across the Chinese and 
Indian borders, Thimphu is hardly a megalopolis; so how 
hard could it be to accommodate a population of 130,000 
people? Moreover the boundary extension in 1999 extended 
the urban zone from 8 km2 to 26 km2. Despite these 
advantages of a “governable”7 population size and fresh 
supply of land, the city has familiar big city symptoms of 
shortage of affordable housing. In 2002, more than 10% of 
the population of Thimphu was living in hutments and 
squatter settlements without proper basic services 
(Mayerhofer et al ADB 2002: 1).  In a recent survey, shortage 
of affordable housing was identified as the priority issue by 
the urban poor (ADB-NSB 2013). According to a study 
conducted in 1999, there was an annual requirement of 
about 780 dwelling units in Thimphu (MoWHS 2006). 
 
The plan document makes repeated references to the issue of 
shelter for low income groups and even proposes to land for 
low income housing.  
 
Where we are proposing land pooling and Local Area 
Plans we must designate plots for lower middle class 
group units, by providing for them in the layouts… 
There is a hidden population in the city of Thimphu, 
which we must bring out into the open, and address 
as a public policy and planning issue… In every 
Local Area Plan of the city a small high-density 
village of low-income units should be constructed for 
domestic servants who will work in the area. Another 
                                              
7Yates 1977 
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strategy.... this is a policy area that cannot wait!” 
(MoWHS 2004: 38).  
 
Although the plan made this proposition, in practice, housing 
provision was left to the market and virtually no new stock 
has been built for the low income groups. The National 
Housing Development Corporation Ltd (NHDCL) which has 
the mandate to provide affordable housing has not invested in 
Thimphu since the Changjiji Complex proposed in the late 
1990s.Consequently, low income groups are coping by living 
in shared accommodation. In 2007, 16% of Bhutan‟s urban 
population was neither homeowner nor tenant but living with 
family and friends (National Council of Bhutan 2010: 82).   
 
On the other hand, because of the fresh supply of land in 
extended areas, housing supply has shot up and many new 
homes are going empty. However, as it is priced for a different 
set of clients, the low income housing group cannot afford it. 
Although many government officials claim that affordable 
housing is not a problem for Thimphu because some houses 
are going vacant (Rai 2013), it may be argued that there is 
instead a gross mismatch between supply and demand for 
housing, with too much supply of highly priced stock and too 
little stock of affordable housing. Not only is this an issue for 
the low income group but also for the landlords who built by 
borrowing from the bank as they are unable to pay back their 
loans (Dema 2013).  
 
Despite the foresight of the Bhutanese government and plan 
for development control, the outcomes in the aftermath of 
plan execution have been the opposite. So what went wrong? 
The Thimphu Structure Plan made one small assumption 
that didn‟t hold true. Although it calculated many technical 
details to perfection, it miscalculated one tiny detail - that 




implemented. Why is that not so? This is what the study has 
set sail to discover. 
1.3 This study: Why do rules not work? 
This study is about the challenges of institutionalizing a new 
policy, illustrated by the case of urban planning in Thimphu, 
the capital city of Bhutan. It shows that the implementation 
of the Thimphu Structure Plan 2003-27 was full of gaps, which 
led to paradoxical outcomes including imbalances in the 
housing stock, construction on green areas allocated for open 
spaces and dilution of traditional architecture – the very 
features that the plan was designed to regulate.  
Question & Hypothesis 
The question driving the research is to explain why there is a 
lack of compliance to the city plan and identify the 
mechanisms through which the planning rules codified in the 
Thimphu Structure Plan are being deviated.  
 
The hypothesis is derived from the literature on the „Sociology 
of Compliance‟ which is dominated by two main hypotheses a) 
misfit and b) veto players (Falkner 2006). The misfit argument 
has been used often to explain the difficulties of transferring 
policies of the European Union to EU nations. According to 
his hypothesis, the higher is the misfit between a policy (e.g. 
EU norms) and national norms, lower is the policy 
compliance. The veto hypothesis is less grounded in 
institutions and more about the role of actors in policy co-
production. It predicts that the higher the number of veto 
players (or veto power) in opposition to a given policy, the 
lower is the level of policy compliance. To explain the lack of 
compliance to the TSP, we assume that both hypotheses may 
turn out to be valid (or not) and the study aims to identify 
potential misfits as well as veto players that may be slowing 
down plan implementation.  
Thimphu’s Growing Pains 
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Limiting the scope of study 
Many of these issues (loss of traditional architecture, shortage 
of affordable housing) are not new for Bhutan. The 1986-2000 
Plan for Thimphu, which preceded the TSP, also expressed 
concern about acute housing shortages. If we go back to the 
1980s, it seems that some things never change. The United 
Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS) was assisting 
the Royal Government of Bhutan (RGOB) to preserve 
traditional architecture in urban areas which was a new 
scenario for Bhutan. Even then over 60% of total building 
cost was expended on imported materials and labour (UNDP 
1987) and even today dependence on India for construction 
labour and materials continues to trouble Bhutan as 
manifested by the 2012 currency crisis. In that sense, these 
issues predate the plan and cannot be solely attributed as 
outcomes of the plan. However, the plan with its deep 
ambitions has not been able to correct them. In order to not 
build up the reader‟s expectations, it must be stated outright 
that this study does not dissect the full anatomy of the three 
outcomes mentioned above. For that, one would have to study 
many inter-related factors including housing finance, 
imported labour policy, timber restriction policy, traditional 
architecture policy and markets like housing and the 
construction industry. Instead, this study is about one policy 
- the TSP - to examine why, despite the rules in place, the 
plan does not work. Therefore, this study explains only a 
fraction of the issue but zooms into the details from one 
policy angle.  
 
It should also be pointed out that while zooming into the TSP, 
the focus is on the experience of the Local Area Plans (LAP). 
Of the 26 sq km within the municipal boundary, only about 
12.1 sq km fall under the first set of Local Area Plans (LAP). 
Ten of the twelve LAPs are in extended areas to the north and 




Therefore, even within the planning story of Thimphu, the 
focus is on implementation within LAPs, which is a story 
about transformation of peri-urban areas.  
 
Finally, it should also be mentioned that just because this 
study is focussing on implementation gaps of the plan, the 
reader should not be misled to think that the TSP has failed. 
In fact, it is still in a process of implementation. Moreover, 
had the TSP not been in place, the extended areas may not 
have had access to municipal services like water and roads; 
in the worst case scenario, residents would have had to make 
their own private arrangements as is the case in many parts 
of Asian cities.  
 
To be very clear, the agenda of this research is not to blame 
anyone but bring to light the complexity of the issue in a 
simplified form. A common perception is that not enough is 
being done to guide the development of Thimphu city. This 
study aims to provide an informed perspective on what is 
being done. Hopefully, the reader will be able to see how 
much time and energy is being invested by the City 
Corporation on a day-to-day basis even if results are not as 
apparent. By seeing how the city‟s affairs are managed from 
an outsider‟s perspective, readers can evaluate for themselves 
where the wall between individual interests and collective 
goals should break for a better city of their future. 
Relevance of the study 
Although this study will explain only a small part of 
Thimphu‟s story, it remains highly relevant because 
Thimphu‟s planning is becoming the role model for other 
towns in Bhutan. The same modality of “Structure Plan” is 
being replicated to develop Structure Plans for other towns 
like Phuentsholing. As Thimphu was the first experiment, 
turning back to look at what type of unforeseen issues came 
up and how they were resolved will be very useful to draw 
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lessons for Bhutan which is rapidly urbanizing like other 
Asian cities. 
 
This study will also be relevant for governments and planners 
outside Bhutan. Unlike in Indian and Chinese cities, where 
planning is the guise behind which the state acquires land 
from farmers in peri-urban areas, ultimately to hand over to 
the market; planning in Thimphu is based on the technique 
of land pooling, which is similar to land readjustment 
methods in Nepal, Japan, Thailand and Germany (Dorji 
2003b). Instead of land acquisition, the state asks 
landowners to contribute up to a third of their land. In 
exchange, the state does not provide monetary compensation 
but infrastructure and services. This means that when urban 
peripheries or extended areas are developed, instead of 
displacement induced by development, landowners get to stay 
on their land, on a smaller parcel but with higher property 
values. Therefore, the study is relevant for anyone interested 
in an experiment of urban planning in an inclusive manner.  
 
The study is also useful for research on institutions to know 
why codifying laws do not necessarily guarantee expected 
results. Despite contradictory evidence, the faith in 
institutional design to steer policy outcomes remains 
dominant, as evident from the financing agenda of large 
multilateral institutions like The World Bank and recent 
decentralization reforms of many national governments. This 
study will explain which institutional reform is not a 
sufficient condition for effective social change.  
1.4 Argument and logic of chapters 
The main argument is that rules do not work because they 
create a conflict of interest for some actors and these veto 
players find a way to subvert the rules. The dominant reason 




deviations on a gradual case by case basis. In the slow but 
steady process of exception-making, the shape of the city 
evolved and spilled out of the mould of the urban plan. The 
main mechanism for plan deviations was not corruption 
through bribes or some other blatant form of rule violation, 
but a much more subtle process of negotiation and going 
around the rules without legally breaking them. This form of 
entrepreneurialism to beat the constraints of the system is 
termed “strategic action”8 and is the main mechanism to 
explain how deviations were legitimized.  
 
The first chapter provides an overview of the profile of 
Thimphu city and its residents. Much of the data is extracted 
from the Census 2005 at the city level. Data from building 
permits is also studied to understand the recent construction 
boom. Finally, the last section characterizes the housing 
market and comments on inequalities in property ownership, 
which is a new urban disparity for Bhutan. Most citizens own 
land in rural Bhutan due to the royal policy of “Kidu”, which 
allows citizens to apply to His Majesty‟s office for a land grant 
but ownership patterns are changing with migration to the 
city. Compared to the impressive figure of 84% land 
ownership at the national level, only about a third of urban 
households (32%) own land in Bhutan (ADB-NSB 2013: 59). 
 
The second chapter turns to the Thimphu Structure Plan 
(TSP) to give the reader an understanding of the plan‟s 
objectives and outcomes. The first section presents the main 
planning tools. The second section gives evidence of some 
deviations using data from a planning audit undertaken by 
the Ministry of Works and Human Settlements (MoWHS) in 
2008. The final section analyses the nature of these 
deviations.  
                                              
8 Fligstein & McAdam 2013 
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The third chapter discusses the governance of Thimphu city 
by mapping all the actors who interact with the Thimphu City 
Corporation to influence decisions related to the plan.  
 
The fourth chapter is about strategies of negotiation between 
veto players who challenge planning codes and the main 
implementing authority, the Thimphu City Corporation. 
Minutes of the town committee‟s meetings are used to give 
illustrations of the kind of complications that arise in plan 
implementation. Based on my own three-month fieldwork in 
Thimphu earlier this year including direct observation at the 
municipal office, I analyse how the original rules are 
challenged and how the implementing authorities legitimize 
planning deviations.  
 
Finally, the study concludes with the findings by answering 
the research question and revisiting the two hypotheses.  
Some implications are also presented for policy makers to get 




II. Research Design 
This study has set sail to discover why rules fail to achieve 
their intended objectives by examining how actors interact 
with the rules and co-produce outcomes. This is not a new 
puzzle in the social sciences, as the question has been asked 
before, particularly in Public Policy Analysis, Sociology of 
Organizations and Critical Legal Studies. But it is still a very 
interesting question that has not been fully explained. At the 
same time, this question is absolutely central to understand 
the transformation of cities in which urban planning has a 
prominent role. Despite attempts by generations of 
professionals and governments to organize cities through the 
tool of urban planning, the dream city of the plan remains a 
mythical place. In most cities, urban planning and 
regeneration efforts produced gross dis-functionalities 
(Jacobs 1961). While we have drawn some lessons about the 
benefits of mixed use and inclusive spaces, we are yet to 
understand why improving the design of the plan alone (case 
in point: Thimphu Structure Plan) is not a sufficient condition 
to guarantee planning success. In other words, why are rules 
not sufficient to shape outcomes? Because there are actors 
who play with them, as we„ve been told before. This section 
takes a quick look at the various angles from which this 
puzzle has been entered.  
2.1 Literature review 
Public policy Analysis: Implementation failures 
Implementation failure is a central theme in Public Policy 
Analysis and the role of actors, particularly interest groups in 
deviating policy outcomes has been a concern both for 
scholars and practitioners. In the US from the early 1920s 
and 30s, these concerns were expressed notably at the 
University of Chicago in Charles E. Merriam‟s pioneering 
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work on Behaviouralism. Merriam emphasized the role of 
political behaviour of individuals and groups, which he felt 
would be more telling than the characteristics of formal 
institutions like the legislature and legal codes (Grigsby 
2011:15) basically arguing that rules play only a marginal 
role in explaining outcomes.  
 
John Dewey, philosopher and education reformer, founded a 
school of thought called Pragmatism in which public policy is 
seen as an experiment. The “problematic situations” faced by 
public administrators can be resolved through a “process of 
inquiry”. The  qualitative  nature  of  human  experience is 
such that the  feeling  that  something  is  wrong  comes 
before  its  recognition can be articulated  in words  or 
measured (Shields 2008). In a pragmatic perspective 
therefore, policy-making should be seen as an ongoing 
exercise with flexible goals so that retrospective lessons from 
field experiences can be integrated into prospective design.  
 
In the 1970s, Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron B. Wildavsky, 
published Implementation in which they observed that an 
organization like the American Economic Development 
Agency could not fulfil its objectives because there were too 
many actors influencing the decision-making process with 
multiple goals, bargaining with each other and delaying 
implementation. This is very similar to observations of how 
organizations work, giving a centre-stage role for actors. 
Sociology of Organizations: power games among 
competing actors 
The literature in the Sociology of Organization has its central 
concern in how employees interpret organizational rules and 
impact the attainment of collective goals of the organization. 
The 1958 book Organizations by Herbert A. Simon and James 
G. March criticized the behavioural assumptions of classical 




management school” and “scientific management” 
approaches, for not paying sufficient attention to the 
motivations driving employee behaviour (Tosi 2008: 93). They 
took a Weberian interest in motivations underlying social 
action9 and emphasized the cognitive aspects of organization 
members (March 1958: 5). They criticized the classical 
approaches for neglecting internal or intra-organizational 
conflict but remained confined to analysing the organization 
as a black box, with little appreciation for inter-organizational 
conflicts (Fligstein 2001).  
 
This is also symptomatic in the pioneering work of Michel 
Crozier, father of organizational sociology in France. His work 
with Erhard Friedberg stands out in its treatment of power 
relations among members of the organization. One of their 
main contributions was to show how rules itself are an 
enactment of power games among sets of actors who are 
constantly negotiating the rules; “system exists only through 
the actors, who alone can give it life, and who alone can 
change it” (Crozier & Friedberg 1977: 9). In this sense, they 
agree that agency is constrained by internal power relations 
but not in the Giddens way in which external social 
structures constrain action, “the actor doesn’t exist outside 
the system which defines his freedom and the rationality that 
guides his action” (Crozier & Friedberg 1977: 9). However not 
everybody agrees that agency is autonomous from broader 
structures of stratification and power, as explicated next in 
critiques from the legalist perspective.   
Legalist perspective: indeterminacy of rules 
The Critical Legal Studies tradition developed as a family of 
legal theories in the late 1970s as a sociological critique of the 
classical legal thought of  19th century for overestimating the 
capacity of legal rules to engineer progressive social change. 
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Many of these scholars had been involved in the civil rights 
movement and Vietnam protests and were interested in how 
law worked instrumentally against the interests of minorities. 
While opinions diverged on the social functions of law, their 
central claim was about the “indeterminacy” of legal 
reasoning. A given set of legal principles and doctrines do not 
yield determinate answers to disputes because the “facts of a 
case” are viewed from a particular vantage point. For every 
principle or rule in the legal system, it is possible to find a 
rival contradictory one because rules are characterized by 
substantial gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities (Collins 2008).  
 
Most reviews of Critical Legal Studies typically locate this 
literature within the Structuralist tradition because modes of 
legal reasoning are coloured by prevailing power structures 
and institutions of society. However, here it is argued that 
even these scholars have emphasized the role of actors, 
subconsciously if not consciously, because their spotlight is 
turned on the adjudicator and his interpretation of the “facts 
of the case” in the application of law (see for example, the 
policy-analysis10 ideal type in Kennedy 2008 and Rheinstein 
1954).  
 
In a classic book, Rules and Government (1995), Robert 
Baldwin criticized the functionalist perspective (see Davis 
1971) which advocated rules as a means of controlling 
government discretions. His criticism was that such a 
mechanistic treatment of government decision-making pays 
inadequate attention to substantial human interpretative 
work involved in government decision-making (Baldwin 1995: 
25). Discretion is used at several levels in rule applications: 
from judgements involved in defining issues as relevant to 
ways in which cases/policies proceed through the 
                                              
10 Policy analysis combines elements of both substantive and formal 




organizational handling system so that „facts of the case‟ are 
taken for granted rather than as a constructed reality. 
Decision-makers reflect ideological stances of a society and 
are products of a whole series of frameworks.  
 
Thus the interaction of actors with rules has been 
documented in a variety of contexts before and the common 
thread weaving them together is the limited predictive 
capacity of policies, organizational rules and legal codes - 
broadly conceived under the umbrella term “institutions”. 
This research takes a sociological definition of the term 
institution, defined as “a relatively enduring collection of rules 
and organized practices, embedded in structures of meaning 
and resources that are relatively invariant in the face of 
turnover of individuals…” (March and Olsen 1989, 1995 as 
defined in March & Olsen 2009: 3). In this view, rules, 
structures and norms are the building blocks of institutions 
and prescribe appropriate behaviour for specific actors in 
specific situations (March & Olsen 2009, Davies & Trounstine 
2012). A distinction is therefore made between institutions as 
rules (regulatory norms) and institutions as organizations 
(actors).  
What prevents rules from working? Actors (veto players) 
or Structure (institutional misfit) 
Although everybody agrees that rules don‟t work as designed 
and create unintended effects, it is not very clear what exactly 
the intermediating factor is. Is it human actors (as individuals 
or organized groups) who have an agency to manipulate rules 
and steer outcomes? Or is it broader structural forces at work 
that reproduce the status quo no matter how the rules are 
designed (e.g. discrimination against race in the Critical 
Legalist perspective)? The structure vs. agency debate has left 
a yawning gap in sociology, created by the primacy attributed 
to actor agency or structural forces in shaping outcomes. 
Anthony Giddens‟ theory of structuration (1984) attempted to 
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strike a balance without ordering one above the other and 
show how both micro agents and macro structures mutually 
enact social systems, but empirical applications of the theory 
have been limited.  
 
Contemporary research on rules, currently developing within 
the Sociology of Compliance displays symptoms of a similar 
cleavage. The two main hypotheses that dominate the 
literature on non-compliance of rules are a) veto players and 
b) misfit (Falkner 2006). The former postulates that 
successful compliance is inversely related with the number of 
veto players (Tsebelis 1995, 2002 in Falkner 2006) and hence 
attributes primacy to actors. The misfit hypothesis is that 
compliance is directly related to the goodness of fit between 
new rules and the existing institutional and regulatory 
traditions (Mastaenbroek 2005, He´ritier 1995) and thus 
leans towards structure. The empirical study of 15 EU 
member states by Falkner et al concluded that both claims 
are partially true but contingent on contexts; for example, the 
goodness of fit argument works only where countries have a 
culture of law observance. Thus more evidence based 
research is needed to validate these hypotheses conclusively.  
Actor vs. Institutions in the urban context 
The structure vs. agency debate, ubiquitous in a sociological 
study of any subject, went live on the urban stage post the 
1950s‟ developments in theories of urban politics. Actor-
centred theories of „urban politics‟ were constructed 
somewhat in opposition to the structuralist „institutional 
theories‟ (Lowndes 2001). This provoked „neo-institutional‟ 
revisions of the old instituionalism from the late 1980s 
onwards. 
 
The „structuralists‟ originally camped on grounds of 
institutional theory before moving base to varieties of „new 




policy of decentralization i.e. devolving power from the 
provincial to the municipal level of government would qualify 
as practitioners of institutional theory. However, empirical 
studies of institutional reform challenged the Rawlsian notion 
that good institutions can create a just society. For example, 
opening up municipal-decision making to citizens did not 
weaken but strengthened socio-spatial marginalization in a 
Mexican city (Lombard 2013). There is plenty of evidence 
discrediting the agency of institutional design. However, this 
argument by itself - that rules are not working - is not 
sufficient to undermine the determinism of institutions, nor 
the primacy of actors; because broader structures of social 
inequality and power relations regulating behaviour 
(institutions in our definition) could be at play. 
 
What really attacked institutionalism theory from an actor-
centred perspective began with Floyd Hunter's 1953 study of 
Atlanta. It showed that the municipal government, although 
designated as the official decision-taking body, was effectively 
not the one making municipal policy. Instead, the decision-
making process for the city was captured by socio-economic 
elites (Hunter 1953). Later Robert Dahl, in his 1961 study of 
New Haven came to exemplify the pluralist school as he 
showed that urban decision-making was much more 
conflicted and policy outcomes were a result of bargaining 
between competing members of the community (Dahl 1961). 
This debate between the elitists and the pluralists became 
famous as the „community power debate‟ but both schools 
agreed that more than the institutional structure of local 
governments, it was the pursuit of political actors that 
determined urban policy (Davies & Trounstine 2012). By the 
1980s and 1990s, the word urban “governance” as opposed to 
“government” began to be used to turn attention to broader 
influences of external actors on government decision-making 
(private investor, donors, civil society).  
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2.2 Puzzle: How do actors escape institutional 
constraints? 
The actor vs. institution debate in urban theories has a great 
deal of scope to be further problematized. Those attributing 
agency to actors have focused on how actor coalitions shape 
institutions and policies. On the other hand, the 
neoinstitutionalists have focussed on ways in which 
institutions constrain behaviour and steer outcomes. But 
there is not yet a fully developed explanation of why, how and 
which, actors escape institutional constraints. Agent-driven 
perspectives would say that actors subvert the rules but they 
do not develop much on the embeddedness of actors in their 
broader institutional environments which frame social action.  
Some literature on policy implementation failures also 
emphasizes the role of actors in co-production of policies, 
thereby problematizing theories of institutional design (Lipsky 
1980, Ostrom 1990) but they do not explain why even 
improved design again falls in the same pit and is not a 
guarantee to steer actor behaviour. In fact, a faith in 
institutional design to steer policy outcomes remains 
dominant, despite contradictory evidence, as evident from the 
financing agenda of large multilateral institutions like The 
World Bank and recent decentralization reforms of many 
national governments.  
2.3 Theoretical framework: Strategic action 
fields 
To explain the loose grasp of institutions on actors, we use 
the work of Neil Fligstein and Doug McAdam in their new 
book, A Theory of Fields. This work is quite fitting because it 
provides a very flexible framework for us to think about actor 






The key is to break down the big macro structure into smaller 
units or “fields” of meso-level order. Actors can act 
strategically to change the rules in a given field and yet be 
constrained by the larger rules of the game of the broader 
field environment – this is the interpretation of Fligstein in 
this research. The following are the four key concepts that 
will be borrowed and adapted to explain the field set-up or the 
“field universe” in our case study.  
 
Field: A field is a meso-level social order and the 
fundamental unit of collective action in society. Fields are 
socially constructed arenas where actors with different 
resource endowments operate with shared understandings 
that are not necessarily consensual A field can be 
conceptualized fairly flexibly; it has been defined before as a 
market (Fligstein 2001), an organization (DiMaggio and Powel 
1983), a policy domain (Laumann and Knoke 1987) and a 
network (Powell et al 2005).  
 
In this research we employ “field” as an organization – 
Thimphu City Corporation (TCC). The interest is to capture 
TCC‟s interactions with all those actors who influence its 
decisions on the Thimphu Structure Plan (TSP 2003-27). In 
other words, the unit is analysis is to study social action of 
actors interacting with the TCC in the governance field.  
 
Field Environment: Fligstein characterizes the relationship a 
field has with “other fields” and together the two constitute 
the field environment. In his view, the broader field 
environment resembles a Russian doll which is composed of a 
complex web of fields nested in one another (Fligstein 
2013:9).  
 
We want to be very clear on the visualization of the relations 
between a field and its broader environment in this study. 
The Matryoshka doll metaphor is not the best visualization 
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because as Fligstein says, a field is embedded in a complex 
network of fields, and hence not tightly encapsulated within 
each larger field. It is more appropriate to think of the field in 
terms of a universe of networks of fields. This allows us to 
look at a field embedded not just within the broader universe 
or master field but also within a network of fields. The field 
environment governs not just the internal workings of a field 
but also how different fields relate to each other. In our study 
the “master field” is the state field within which the Thimphu 
City Corporation “field” is embedded. However we add an 
intermediary and that is the “network of fields” constructed 
as the policy governance network comprising of TCC and all 
other fields with which it interacts to implement the urban 
plan. Thus the field (TCC) is embedded in a network of fields 
(policy governance network) which is itself embedded in a 
master field (Bhutanese state) and together this set up makes 
up the “field universe” in our study, which is simply a more 
nuanced version of Fligstein‟s “field environment”.  
 
Strategic Action: Strategic action is the attempt of social 
actors to create and sustain social worlds by securing the 
cooperation of others.  
 
We just add that rationality of strategic action is bounded so 
strategic action is also framed by the common repertoire of 
strategies.  
 
Social skill: The ability to fashion such agreements and 
enforce them requires that strategic actors possess some 
amount of “social skill” (Fligstein 2012: 14). This set of skills 
is assumed to be distributed “perhaps normally” across the 
population (Fligstein 2001).  
 
We divide social skill into two a) negotiation skills – 




endowments (social attributes and networks) – distributed 
unevenly.  
 
Challengers and Incumbents: Incumbents are those actors 
who wield disproportionate influence within a field and whose 
interests and views tend to be heavily reflected in the 
dominant organization of the SAF. Challengers are those who 
challenge the field order to change it.  
 
Since our aim is not to explain field change and stability but 
rule compliance and deviation, we completely revise this 
definition but retain the idea of conflict in interactions. For us 
there are a) claim-makers who challenge a given rule before 
the municipal committee and then there are b) decision-
takers who decide whether or not to authorize the claim for 
rule exemption or rule revision. Together they enact the 
transformation of the urban planning field in Thimphu.  
 
Research question  
The broad research question is about limited capacity of 
formal rules to effect change.  The aim is to explain why and 
how actors escape institutional constraints. At least five 
dimensions emerge as key themes.  
 
a) Why is legal reform not an adequate condition to achieve 
the intended change?  
 
b) What are the other factors that mediate between objectives 
and outcomes of rules? 
 
c) What are the conditions for generating compliance? 
 
d) What are some of the unintended consequences and 
paradoxes?    
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e) Do rules have some other value even if they cannot achieve 
intended objectives?  
 
These broad questions are contextualized for the case study: 
urban planning in Thimphu, Bhutan to formulate the 
research question driving this research: 
 
How can we explain urban developments that are taking place 
in contravention of the 2004 Thimphu Structure Plan? What are 




Deriving from Fligstein‟s framework, the argument is that the 
key mechanism explaining the “black hole” of non-
compliance11 is “strategic action” by actors. Legal codes are 
not an adequate condition to steer policy outcomes because 
actors intervene with their own goals and strategies and 
divert the objectives. The two mutually compatible hypotheses 
are the following: 
 
Veto: The greater is the veto power, the lesser is the policy 
compliance. If legal reform challenges the interests of actors, 
they will find strategies to manipulate the system and become 
veto players. The greater the social skill (negotiation ability 
and resource endowments), the greater the likelihood of 
strategic action and subversion of objectives.  
 
Misfit: The greater the fit between legal codes and non-
codified cultural norms12, the greater the compliance. If there 
is misfit between the policy‟s norms and prevailing 
institutional architecture, actors may not see the law as 
legitimate and have little incentive to comply. Misfits can be 
                                              
11 Mastenbroek 2005 




various types: authority misfit, policy misfit, institutional 
misfit. By using “norm misfit” as the definition, we can 
encompass all types of misfit whether in the institutional 
architecture or content of the policy. 
  
Case study selection 
In a paper calling for “new geographies of theory”, Ananya 
Roy argued that dominant theories on cities are rooted in the 
EuroAmerican experience and exhibit a neo-orientalist 
tendency when they characterize the experience of cities from 
the Global South as “interesting, anomalous, different, and 
esoteric” (Roy 2009). Her argument is that to capture the 
multiple modernities of cities, the dominant centre for theory 
making must move to the global south. However, this very 
suggestion reifies the difference between the global north and 
south – one that Jennifer Robinson tried to collapse in her 
book Ordinary Cities (2002). Robinson‟s agenda was similar in 
that she too wants urban theory to overcome its Western bias 
however the approach is very different. She suggested that we 
need to change the gaze with which we look at first-world and 
third-world cities because all cities are “ordinary”; at the end 
of the day we can find both the high rise CBD and the slum in 
Paris and in Delhi. So her point was that we need new criteria 
to compare cities in the global north and south without 
reifying their binary distinctions.  
 
The Robinson way was more appealing but Roy‟s suggestion 
could not be ignored. Both challenge classic conceptions of 
how we understand the “modern” experience. Why do we 
notice the slums of Asia but not Europe? (See Aguilera 2013 
as an exception). So one way to reconcile the suggestions of 
both was to shift the case study to the global south but 
instead of using a post-modernist framework, use a classical 
Weber / Fligstein framework and check out how far can their 
concepts be stretched to the global south and what value 
does the change of context add back to the theory. Weber‟s 
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analysis of rationalization processes is from a typically 
modernist standpoint so it would be interesting to see how 
right (or wrong?) was he by analysing the experience of a 
budding democracy that is just stepping into, what many 
would call, the age of “modernity”.   
 
Bhutan, a small country sandwiched between India and 
China, is currently in a very interesting process of transition. 
Ruled by the Wangchuck family since 1907, the kingdom 
adopted its first codified Constitution only six years ago in 
2008. In the same year, parliamentarians contested elections 
for the first time on political party lines through direct and 
universal suffrage. 2008 also marked a century of rule under 
the monarchy and commemorated with the fifth king taking 
the place of his father. In this new cycle of state development 
in Bhutan, the Prime Minister and the king (as Head of State) 
are to govern in a formula codified in the Constitution. By 
Weberian terms, this qualifies as a “rationalization” process in 
which traditional authority of the monarchy is converting into 
legal authority.  
 
However, what makes Bhutan unique is that the transition 
was a top-down process and hand-held by His Majesty, the 
former king, rather than an outbreak of popular mass 
uprising or a coup breaking out from elite factionalisms 
which characterize most democratic transitions. Unlike 
Morocco, international organizations did not play an overt 
role in pressuring the monarchy; if there was any pressure, it 
is known only to the inner corridors of power and not in 
public knowledge. There have been some pressures from 
political parties in exile in Nepal notably in the early 1990s, 
but this issue goes back to 1954 and there is not a good 
match between external pressure and the timing of the 
decision for reform. Thus the decision to democratize is rather 
seen as a pre-emptive move in a calm time so that the 




the monarchy for times to come. The whole episode worked to 
further increase the legitimacy of the monarchy as the 
international community watched starry-eyed when the 
former Druk Gyalpo went across Bhutan campaigning for 
democracy against a resistant urban bourgeoisie as well as 
rural peasantry. Although this was initially surprising to me 
but after having lived for a short period in Bhutan and seen 
the kind of respect the elites that I interacted with have for 
their king, I no longer doubt the credibility of the media 
reports about the Bhutanese people‟s reluctance to 
democratic change. I take this attitude as an observable 
“social fact” but with my own interpretation. First of all, in 
these reports, a very specific definition of Bhutanese is 
applied, that of legally recognized citizens and excludes 
claims for democracy by some Bhutanese in exile, for 
example, founder of the Druk National Congress created in 
1994. Second of all, the concept of “democracy” was new for 
the country and even today some people don‟t understand the 
word in rural Bhutan (as told to me by a GNH surveyor, 
20/01/2014). A transition led and planned by the king in a 
time when much of the population had not asked for it, 
created a situation where democracy has to be learnt through 
legal socialization.  
 
Thus, democracy came without a change in politics or 
political values. Given this specificity of the transition, 
Bhutan forms a fertile case study to explore what legitimacy 
of legal authority really means where change in legal codes 
precedes change in social norms. It is a context where 
authority based on tradition could be more legitimate than 
that based on legal authority even as the legitimation basis of 
the society is changing. Bhutan is really an ideal case if the 
intellectual agenda is to discover limits of formal institutions 
because here one can distinguish more clearly between social 
norms and the newly codified laws which are yet to be 
internalized. 
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To sum up, Bhutan‟s capital city is befitting for a research 
agenda seeking to explore rule deviations where misfit 
(dissonance of new codified rules with prevailing norms) is a 
hypothesis. At the same time the case study offers some 
promising revisions to the hypothesis about veto players. In 
Bhutan, the state has dominated social life including the 
market so the private sector is still very underdeveloped (and 
hence few veto players). The bureaucracy forms the most 
important elite group after the royals and corruption 
perception index is one of the lowest in Asia (Transparency 
International corruption perception index), possibly because 
the king hand-picked and created the civil service from 
scratch within the last few decades and anti-corruption is an 
official policy objective. All of these indicate that the state 
should have the capacity to govern and compliance should be 
high because veto players are few. But this is not the case 
and remains a puzzle to be discovered. 
2.4 Methodology 
This study is an extracted version of the Master‟s thesis 
prepared for the M.A. in Urban Affairs (Governing the Large 
Metropolis) at the Institut d’études politiques (Sciences Po), 
Paris. The data was collected over a three month field trip to 
Thimphu, Bhutan during January-April 2014. During my 
stay I was hosted by the Centre for Bhutan Studies & GNH 
Research. I worked independently and my contribution to the 
Centre was to be a 10-15 page report on the structural and 
design aspects of Thimphu‟s planning. Although the Centre 
played no role in setting the agenda for my research, it 
influenced my “problem-definition”. For example, dilution of 
traditional architecture is seen as an undesireable outcome.  
 
In terms of methodology, this research made a choice for 
qualitative methods because the research is grounded in 




essence of state-society relations, how compliance and social 
control works, what is legitimacy based on etc. Since it is a 
theory of social action, the aim is to deconstruct individual 
perceptions and motivation for action. I did this primarily by 
capturing the framings used by claim-makers as well as 
decision-takers to legitimize exemptions from planning rules.  
 
My main method was Direct observation. I sat daily in the 
office of the Chief, Implementing & Monitoring Section (I&MS) 
for about 20 days in the month of March 2014. I also had one 
occasion to be invited to an office party which gave me a good 
sense of the social milieu of this section of the bureaucracy. 
This gives the added advantage of understanding their beliefs, 
values and working styles, which is more complex than the 
mechanistic bureaucrat described in Weber‟s work. I had the 
opportunity to directly observe one part of the organization. I 
observed the workings of the Urban Planning Division (UPD) 
and the Development Control Division (DCD) which are 
divisions under the Thimphu City Corporation (see Annex for 
TCC organogram).  
 
My main data source for the case study was the town 
committee discussions as I am interested in understanding 
how the municipal decision-making process works. I had 
access to all 18 samples of the minutes of the bimonthly town 
committee meetings from February 2011 to February 2014, 
held since the first elected mayor came in 2011. I also 
extracted city level data from the Census conducted by the 
National Statistics Bureau in 2005. This was indispensable 
for characterizing the profile of the city and residents. 
 
The direct observation method is complemented with other 
methods such as interviews and historical analysis. The 
sample of people I interviewed was mostly government 
officials from organizations/agencies that seemed relevant for 
the case study such as NHDC, MoWHS, TCC, NLCS. I was 
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interested less by the Parliamentarians as current ministers 
had just entered government in 2013. My focus was more on 
bureaucrats who had been operating over longer tenures. I 
also preferred to talk to staff working on the ground as I felt 
that they could give more detailed descriptions than their 
superiors. In general, I found the government in Bhutan to be 
remarkably accessible. I was able to get interviews within 24 
hours of calling and requesting for appointments. However, 
many requested for anonymity and I felt that informal 
discussion was a a preferred format for my interviewees who 
sometimes did not want to be quoted. So in this research any 
information quoted from my discussions is only dated but not 
named but I have maintained very detailed notes and a 
precise record of who I met on which day. 
 
Finally, to understand the broader Bhutanese state-society 
field, I used historical and content analysis. The Kuensel 
newspaper, dating back to 1968 was a vital source for basic 
information on the state‟s programmes and policies as this 
paper was the only print media until the mid-2000s. Thus 
there is no sample bias but the content requires analytical 
discretion as the paper basically worked as a mouthpiece and 
information bulletin of the state. Bhutan also has a tradition 
to make proceedings of parliamentary debates publicly 
available in English since 1953 which allowed me to go back 
to crucial moments and dig deeper into the polity‟s history. 
This was useful to identify dominant types of rationality and 
authority in Bhutan and get a broad understanding of 
changes overtime. Although the archives only provided me 
with the official view, my complementary informal discussions 
with non-technocrats helped me develop my own 
interpretation of why news was reporting the way it was or 




III. Thimphu City: Growth Dynamics 
This chapter quantifies the changing profile of Thimphu city 
in the last decade. This background serves as evidence for 
Chapter III which is about the conflict of interests for and 
against the plan‟s rules and which follows Chapter II which 
lays out the plan‟s objectives. This chapter is divided in three 
parts. It first captures the demographic and socio-economic 
profile of Thimphu‟s residents as per the Census of 2005. The 
second section presents how the shape of Thimphu city is 
growing and changing. Finally, the last section characterizes 
the housing market while quantifying the proportion of 
population that is asset-owning and has access to basic 
services to get an extent of socio-economic disparities.  
3.1 The Residents: Socio-economic & 
demographic profile 
According to the 2005 Census, Bhutan‟s total population 
stood at 634,982 of which Thimphu dzongkhag alone had 
94,102. Of this, Thimphu dzongkhag‟s urban population was 
79,185. Data for urban Thimphu has been extracted to make 
a profile of Thimphu city.  These 79,185 individuals (or 
15,728 households) living in Thimphu city constituted over 
12% of Bhutan‟s total population in 2005. Of the 79,185 
people recorded in the Census, 2851 were visiting.   
Age 
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Figure 1: City of young people  
 
Education 
75.25% residents are literate (of eligible age). This is quite a 
remarkable chart because it shows how quickly education 
has spread in Bhutan since the 1950s and 60s, when the first 
batch of children was sent to school. We can see below that 
the generation above 75 years has an average literacy rate of 
only 22.9%. Compared to their grandparents, over 83% of the 
present generation of youth is literate today. 
   




N = 79,185 
Source: Census 2005 





As the administrative capital, Thimphu has a large share of 
the population employed in government service, up to 40% 
according to one study (Walcott 2009). However this is 
changing as the largely state controlled economy is opening 
up to private sector participation.  
 
According to the 2005 Census, over 67% of the population 
falls in an employable age (15 to 64 years old). 
 
Table 1: Population in working age 
Age Population Percent 
0-14 years  23,798 30.1% 
15-64 years 53,432 67.5% 
65 and above 1955 2.5% 
Total 79,185 100% 
Source: Census 2005 
 
Of the 55,387 residents aged above fourteen (and hence 
eligible for work), 30,190 i.e. 54.5% were employed while the 
remaining 45.5% were unemployed or inactive. Of the 30,190 
employed, the largest proportion or 20% were working in the 
construction sector as road laborers (3263), stone cutters 
(1323), carpenters (1141) etc. 15.8% were working in public 
administration including a large staff of security personnel 
(2191). Transport and communication was the third largest 
sector of employment primarily because of a large number 
working as drivers (1704). Retailers (1185) and business 
professionals (1167), clerks (1024) and maid/baby sitter 
(1173) were some of the most frequent occupations in other 
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Table 2: Sector of employment 
Sector of employment  Population Percent 
Construction 6,089 20.2% 
Public administration/security 4,765 15.8% 
Transport/communication 2,021 6.7% 
Retail/wholesale trade 1,701 5.6% 
Education 1,247 4.1% 
Agriculture 1,155 3.8% 
Hotel/restaurant 1,090 3.6% 
Finance/insurance 836 2.8% 
Health services 668 2.2% 
Manufacturing 569 1.9% 
Electricity/gas/water 523 1.7% 
Mining/quarring 119 0.4% 
Others 9,407 31.2% 
Total 30,190 100% 
Source: Census 2005   
 
When asked if they had worked in the last one week, 26,547, 
i.e. 47.9% of the population aged above fourteen, reported 
“no”. The reasons cited for not working are given in the table 
below. About 16% was looking for work while some 7% 
already had found work from which they were absent or were 
going to resume in the future. 8768 or 33% of this population 
was studying. This coincides nicely with the 9,485 of 
Thimphu‟s population falling in the 15-19 years age group. 
Similarly, 1965 reported old age which also coincides well 
with the 1955 aged above 65 years. About 32% was 
unemployed out of choice mostly because they did not want 
to work or had a home to take care of. 






Table 3: Reason for not working 
Reason cited Freq Percent 
Unemployed, looking for work 4,350 16.4% 
Waiting for work, seasonally employed 875 3.3% 
Studying 8,768 33% 
Absent from work 1,081 4.1% 
Does not want to work 707 2.7% 
Taking care of home 7,687 29% 
Health / Age 3,079 11.6% 
 Source: Census 2005 26,547 100% 
Place of origin 
Less than a third of residents are born in Thimphu. While 
32% of residents come from Thimphu, 58% come from rest of 
Bhutan. By looking at the languages they speak, we can get 
an idea of the regions of Bhutan from which they come. We 
can also see that while 6745 report to be born abroad, 6452 
speak Indian languages. This indicates that about 8% of 
Thimphu city‟s residents are Indian. This makes sense in 
light of the recent construction boom in Thimphu which has 
created demand for a large number of Indian construction 
workers.  
 
Figure 3: City of migrants 
 Place of birth No. % 
Thimphu 25,205 32% 
Rest of Bhutan 45,886 58% 
Abroad 6,745 9% 
Unknown 1,349 2% 
Total 79,185 100% 
Source: Census 2005, N = 79,185 
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Figure 4: Spoken languages 
 
Reasons for migration 
Almost 70% have been staying in current residence for less 
than ten years (Census 2005). While 43% previously resided 
in an urban area, only 45% display a trend of rural to urban 
migration. We may say that the urban to urban figure is 
inflated as probably includes those born in Thimphu (31.8%). 
But even then, only 53% were born in rural areas. The 
predominant reason for migrating is employment followed by 
family move (including marriage) and education.  
 



















Origins Place of birth   Previous residence 
  No. %   No. % 
Urban areas 28,497 36.0   34,388 43.4 
Rural areas 42,594 53.8   36,079 45.6 
Abroad 6,745 8.52   7,342 9.3 
Not stated 1,349 1.7   1,376 1.7 
            
Total 79,185 100   79,185 100 
Source: Census 
2005 




Figure 6: Reasons for moving 
 
3.2 The City: Spatial changes & the 
construction boom 
City growth: 1960s-present 
Urbanization of Thimphu kick-started in the 1960s after 
Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, visited Bhutan in 
1959. India‟s growing dispute with China and Chinese 
occupation of Tibet led to some anxiety that Bhutan might 
become an arena for Sino-Indian confrontation under 
conditions in which China had easier access from the north 
than India from the south (Rose 1977). Consequently, Bhutan 
opened its gates to India and along with it came a whole 
package of development assistance (India financed Bhutan‟s 
first Five Year Plan). The Indian army considered it essential 
to develop a logistic capacity for itself in Bhutan through 
major road construction projects. By 1962 Thimphu‟s first 
motor-road had been built (Norbu 2008: 87). What was 
hitherto a cluster of villages connected by mule paths began 
to slowly transform into Thimphu city as we know it today. In 











120% Source: Census 
2005 
N = 77,868 
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2,834 in 1985 and 1,090 taxis, compared with 69 in 1986 
(Gyelthen 2002a, Tashi 2002). 
 
In 1966, Thimphu became a full capital of the Royal 
Government of Bhutan (Pradhan 2012). This was not always 
the case. Even today the Central Monastic Body retains 
Punakha as the winter capital while spending the summer in 
Thimphu. With the transfer of the Development Secretariat 
from Paro to Thimphu in late 1967, Thimphu grew from a 
village to a town of 10,000 people by late 1970s (Rose 1977). 
The city developed as a centre of administration and grew 
around the Tashichho Dzong which was under reconstruction 
in the 1960s. Along with roads, large tracts of land were 
developed as institutional land – RBA in Lungtenphu, RBP in 
Changzamtog, RBG in Dechencholing and DANTAK in Babesa 
and India House in north Thimph. By the 1970s, agricultural 
land was being used for construction of houses and offices to 
meet the demand of the growing civil service13. Hotels came 
up to host international dignitaries who came to attend the 
fourth king‟s coronation. Norzin Lam developed in the 1970s 
(Norbu 2008). In the 1980s, guest houses increased from 3 
(1980) to 38 (1990) to accommodate foreigners as Bhutan‟s 
international relations with the world were expanding and the 
country opening up to foreign visitors.  
                                              
13 To get a more detailed and visual description of Thimphu‟s 





Tashichho Dzong: The heart of the city 
 
Thimphu has the largest share of the urban population in 
Bhutan and is growing rapidly as is the economy of Bhutan. 
In 1987, Bhutan‟s GDP per capita was $209 (UNCHS 1990) 
which is only a tenth of what it is today (~$2000) and has 
exceeded that of India‟s (~$1800). The city grew from a tiny 
village in the 1960s to a teeming capital city. In the 1990s, 
Thimphu‟s population was just around 25,000 (UNCHS 1990) 
and has grown five times in the last twenty years; this is 
faster than the speed at which Thimphu grew in the entire 
twentieth century. According to a World Bank study, 
Thimphu had one of the fastest annual growth rates in the 
world at over 7% (World Bank 2011: 1). 
 
Table 4: Thimphu's population growth 
 1977 1980s 1991 1997 2000 2005 2012 
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Construction Boom: 2009-2011 
The table below shows the spate of construction activity after 
2008. This is explained by the release of land after finalization 
of LAPs in 2008 aided by the lowering of interest rates for 
construction loans since 2003-04 from 13-14% to 10% by 
most banks. Credit growth in the housing sector was 25 
percent since 200714 (Gyeltsehen 2013). However, building 
applications have dropped after construction loans were 
stopped in 2012. This is a recent measure taken by the 
central bank in order to check the outflow of the Indian rupee 
as Bhutan was facing a currency crisis (shortage of the 
rupee). The rupee crisis in Bhutan is related with the 
construction sector as most of the construction materials and 
labour is imported from India mostly for building 7 newly 
commissioned hydropower plants but also housing 
construction.  
 
Figure 7: Construction boom (2009-11) 
 
                                              
14 Bank of Bhutan‟s housing loan increased by 81% in mid 2005 





















Building Permits: new (major) construction 




Table 5: Applications for building permit 
Yr 1985 
 
1999 2000 „01 „02 „03  „08 ‘09 ‘10 ‘11 „12 
App 80 
 
78 65 77 97 92  110 199 255 329 164 
Source: Thapa 2005, Rai 2013, UNCHS Habitat 1990 
 
Most of the applications have been for residential buildings. 
While the new stock is built for residential use, many of the 
buildings are being used as commercial spaces without a 
change in property tax.  
 
New residential buildings converted into offices and commercial 
spaces 
3.3 Housing Market: Characteristics & 
disparities 
Housing market dynamics 
The draft urban development plan of 1986 pointed out an 
acute shortage of housing for government employees. At that 
time the policy focus was to shift from public housing 
provision to encouraging the private sector to build housing. 
This was the preferred choice as it was felt that the 
government alone could not take on the load of providing 











housing to a growing number of civil service staff. However, 
today, privately built stock dominates the housing market 
and we may once again require a shift in policy thinking.  
 
In 1988, housing benefits and salary payments of the civil 
service, (the predominant population of Thimphu at the time) 
were consolidated. Salaries were increased and a housing 
allowance incorporated. If a government employee took 
accommodation in a RGOB-owned house, 30% salary would 
be deducted (UNCHS 1990). As a result, many opted to rent 
out privately. Prior to this reform, a survey in 1985 found that 
a third of the staff eligible for government housing was 
renting privately and receiving a rental subsidy equivalent to 
15% of salary (UNCHS 2005). It could be thus conjectured 
that in that situation, many preferred to rent privately and 
receive allowance of 30%. They would continue to do so until 
rent exceeded 30% of salary which is the case today. 
 
According to the review by the UN Centre for Human 
Settlements (UNCHS 1990), prior to the housing policy reform 
in 1988, 72% of housing units in Thimphu were occupied by 
public servants and owned or rented by government. 
Presently however less than a third (32%) of households live 
in government housing, as calculated from the Census 2005 
data. 
 










Source: Census 2005 




Table 6: House occupation status 
  Gov Housing Private housing Other 
Rented 2,019 6,534 544 
Rent free 2,962 1,556   
Owner occupied   2,113   
Total (15,728) 4,981 10,203 544 
Source: Census 2005 
 
While private construction of housing has mushroomed, most 
of it is put on rent. Of the 10,203 households who live in 
private housing, only 2,113 live in owner occupied housing. 
Overall, there were 15,728 households in Thimphu city in 
2005. Of these 83% live in rented housing (public and private) 
and only 13% live in owner-occupied housing.  
 
Figure 9: Owner occupied vs. Rental housing 
 
 
It is interesting to note that just because a house is rented, it 
does not automatically mean that rent is charged. This may 
be for various reasons depending on whether housing is 
privately or publicly owned. Of the 13,071 households or 83% 
of the total households living in rental housing, 62% live in 
private while the remaining 38% are in government rented 








Source: Census 2005 
N = 15,728 (Households) 
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rent (12% in privately rented and 23% in government rented 
accommodation). Some government housing is provided free 
of cost because it may be on institutional land or because it is 
part of the salary package. Cabinet ministers, monks15 and 
expatriates (e.g. Dutch development associates)16 are some 
examples of the population that does not pay for rented 
housing.   
 
Figure 10: Paid vs. Free housing 
 
Public Housing and NHDCL 
After July 2003 all government owned housing assets were 
transferred to the National Housing Development Corporation 
(NHDC) from the variety of agencies who were managing their 
own housing stock. This does not include institutional 
housing i.e. housing stock located on land owned by various 
institutions like the armed forces, Bhutan Power Corporation, 
education institutes and the hospital. Put together these 
                                              
15
 2000 monks are accommodated in the Tashichho Dzong, as it is 
the summer residence of the central monastic body. 
16
 Article 7 of Bhutan‟s Agreement with the Kingdom Of Netherlands: 
a) provides the development associates with free housing as entitled 
to other international and bilateral volunteers working in Bhutan. 
Source: Census 2005 




institutions own a lot of land (at least 15%)17. Therefore, 
NHDC housing does not accurately reflect all the public 
housing stock that is not privately owned. As an example, in 
2010-11, 90 housing units were built at the headquarters of 
the Royal Bhutan Police which shows up in RBP annual 
reports but not in NHDC‟s. 
 
However, what is generally called “public housing” in Bhutan 
is that falling under the mandate of the NHDC. This housing 
is available only for civil servants and NHDC‟s own staff 
(Gyelmo 2013 article). NHDC‟s primary mandate is to provide 
housing to lower income groups (Wangmo 2012) of civil 
servants. Then there is also “semi-public housing” (Thapa 
2005) provided by NPPF through private contributions of 
members who are also government employees.   
 
Changjiji project was initiated in 2000, for low middle income 
civil servants (Grade 9-15). “To avoid slums and shanty towns 
from developing, there is an urgent need to provide urban 
housing for the low and middle income groups” (8th Five Year 
Plan 199718). Thus there seems to be a growing intolerance to 
unplanned settlements in the late 1990s and by 2000, work 
on the city master plan had begun. Low income civil servants 
could have been building their own huts, as this is happening 
in smaller Bhutanese towns like Zhemgang today where 
supply of public housing is not enough. Changjiji Housing 
Colony would finally comprise 73 buildings with 700 
apartments for about 3,000 people. 
Socio-economic disparities 
Over 70% do not own the building in which they live and 
almost 60% do not own land or a plot in Thimphu. Vehicle 
                                              
17
 Institutional land comprises land owned by: Defense (7%), other 
institutes (8.7%) and religious buildings (0.04%) (MoWHS 2004). 
18 UNCHS 1990Ch 18 
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owners are presently only 30%. With rising incomes and 
consumption, the number of car owners in the city will grow 
steadily.  
 
Table 7: Vehicle ownership 
 
 





Table 8: Asset owning households 
Asset  Owners No. Owners % 
Audio player 10,818 68.8 
TV 10,666 67.8 
Telephone 7,185 45.7 





Source: Census 2005 
N = 15,728 (Households) 
Source: Census 2005 




Fridge 5,989 38.1 
Washing Machine 2,352 15.0 
Livestock 1,919 12.2 
Computer 1,799 11.4 
Internet 930 5.9 
Source: Census 2005, Total households = 15,728 
Segregation dynamics 
In Thimphu, colonies of labourers and construction workers 
live in substandard temporary accommodation. Groups 
providing manual labour, cleaning services, clerical work are 
unable to pay for formal housing and live in self-built huts. In 
late 1987, temporary huts (categorized as squatter by UN 
HABITAT) were 407 of which 211 were occupied by nationals; 
237 were demolished during 1990. In 2004, Cities Alliance 
identified 353 households (1600 residents) living in 28 
squatter settlements across the city (Map 2a).  
A 2004 map made by Cities Alliance identified 28 squatter 
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Table 9: Access to basic services 
Electricity With access     (98.9%)  
Piped water Inside house    (54.3%) Outside house   (44.4%) 
Toilet With flush       (72%) No facility          (3.8%) 
Source: Census 2005 
 
 










Toilets in the labour camp 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter presented an overview of Thimphu city‟s growth. 
Only 29.7% own the building in which they live. 32% are born 
in Thimphu. 30.1% own a car. These are of course not the 
same 30% but roughly give an idea of the city‟s profile. 54% 
has piped water inside the house. 10% is estimated to be 
living in labour camps in squatter-like settlements which 
makes sense considering 8% are Indians who are mostly 
working as labourers in the construction sector, the largest 
sector of employment.  
 
Beyond the socio-economic profile of residents, the chapter 
also showed that there has been a construction boom in the 
city after 2008 which busted in 2012 after the Central Bank 
intervened to discourage construction loans. In 2008, Local 
Area Plans were finalized and new land was released in the 
extended areas for development. This may be one explanation 
for the construction boom. We also saw that most of this 
stock is built as residential even if it is being used for 
commercial purposes. Given that 83% live in rented housing, 
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62% of which is in the private sector, we can estimate that 
much of the new stock has been built for renting out.  
 
Another labour camp at Kalabazaar 
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IV. Thimphu Structure Plan: Objectives & 
Outcomes 
This chapter puts in perspective the emerging gaps between 
the objectives and outcomes of the Thimphu Structure Plan 
(TSP) 2003-27. The aim is to characterize the nature of 
deviations in order to understand where lies the plan‟s 
Achilles heel. Is it a case of misfit in design or is it a problem 
of enforcement? Is there a significant role for veto players in 
diverting the plan objectives? This chapter is placed here so 
that we can be clear about the nature of deviations in the 
plan before we go on to analyse actor interests and strategies 
to subvert the plan. The first section of this chapter presents 
the plan‟s ambitions. The second section gives evidence of 
some deviations using data from a MoWHS planning. The 
final section analyses the nature of these deviations. 
4.1 Policy vision: Development control 
Historical background 
The story of the Thimphu Structure Plan (TSP) is very good 
illustration of the “garbage-can model” elucidated by John 
Kingdon to explain how policy issues enter the agenda. 
Kingdon adapts the “garbage can model of organizational 
choice”19 (Kingdon 1995: 89) from the concept originally 
proposed by Cohen, March & Olsen as a critique of the 
rational version of decision-making in public administration. 
The model argues that policy solutions do not emerge as a 
targeted solution to a particular problem. What usually 
happens instead is that a set or stream of recognized 
problems and a stream of available solutions are present (as if 
mixed in a garbage can) and the final outcome is some 
combination of these. There is usually a “window of 
                                              
19 Cohen, March & Olsen 
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opportunity” when the coupling of the problem, policy and 
politics streams take place and that is how a particular policy 
initiative is born or refined. 
  
In Thimphu, this window of opportunity came towards the 
end of the 20th century, when the United Nations 
(UNDP/UNCHS20) urban management assistance was coming 
to an end as was the 1986-2000 strategic plan and new 
programmes funded by the Danish government (DANIDA21), 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank were 
starting. Their investments were not integrated into one plan 
at that stage. DANIDA was going to invest 70M Kroner to 
develop water, sanitation and sewerage facilities as part of the 
UDSSP22 project; ADB was giving US$ 8.2 M ($ 5.7 as loan) to 
develop roads, footpaths and bridges (Gyalmo 1999). The 
World Bank would complement other donors and emphasize 
institutional strengthening at the district and local levels. The 
Council of Ministers had just been elected by Assembly 
members for the first time in 1998 and they were quite active 
in raising funds which might explain that a) funding was 
attracted and b) funding available for urban infrastructure 
projects may have put urbanization higher on the 
government‟s agenda. In Minister Yeshey Zimba‟s own words,  
 
Time has now come for us to give more attention to 
urban development. Thimphu is growing all over the 
place and things are happening in a haphazhard 
manner (Gyalmo 1999).  
 
                                              
20 United Nations Commission on Human Settlements (UN Habitat) 
21 Danish International Development Agency 
22 Urban Development Sector Support Programme 
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Due to the new infrastructure works23 to be started, for 
example, internal roads and water systems to the north of the 
city in Langophakha and Hejo, it was decided to extend the 
boundaries of the Thimphu municipality. The last urban 
boundary extension had happened in 1994. It was reported in 
Kuensel that “as a part of this overall plan the Thimphu 
municipality boundaries will be extended to Pangrizampa, 
near Dechenhholing, and NgabeRongchu, near Babesa” (Dorji 
1999) – these remain the boundaries even as of today. 
Although the reasons framed in the news may not be the real 
reason, and there may or may not have been someone‟s 
landed interests behind this (which could not be determined), 
what we can say is that the decision to extend the boundary 
and the decision to implement TSP were separate events. 
Although the boundary extension had been announced on 
August 14, 1999 (Kuensel), there was not yet a city master 
plan. This came shortly after, as a random addition to the 
series of events formulating the plan.   
 
In December 1999 a former govt. employee of foreign origin, 
Mr. Rajni Chavda (architect - planner) was visiting Thimphu 
on a four month holiday. During informal meetings with the 
Director General of the Ministry managing urban affairs 
(MoC), he had commented on the problems that could arise 
as a result of the government publicly announcing Thimphu‟s 
boundary extension without a well thought out planning 
exercise for this - the possible undesirable outcomes and 
people rushing to buy land and engaging in speculation were 
pointed out. He suggested that the quickest and most 
inexpensive way for the Government to intervene was to 
prepare a Structure Plan for the capital and its environs. 
 
                                              
23 E.g. main road from Chubachu to taxi stand along BPO; Other 
roads joining Chang Gidaphu and Changzamtog, Thori Lam, and 
Kawajangsa as well as the hospital area and RICB colony. 
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The Director General then asked him whether he could return 
to Bhutan and help prepare a fundable proposal for preparing 
such a Structure Plan. Upon his consent, the Ministry 
employed him in Sept 2000 and by April 2001 Cabinet 
approval from the Royal Govt was obtained for a 
comprehensive project to prepare the Structure Plan - the 
Royal Govt. approved funds totalling under Nu. 5.0 Million for 
hiring a team of urban planning professionals, purchasing 
computers and required software, office furniture etc. The 
consultants hired by the Royal Government were CCBA 
(Christopher Charles Benninger & Associates), Pune, India 
who were willing to carry out the required work within the 
approved budget and time frame of one year beginning June 
2001. Mr. Benninger had earlier worked in Bhutan as a 
consultant on UN projects since 1979 and was well known to 
royal government officials.  
 
This is the story of the genesis of the idea and subsequent 
decisions that led to the preparation of the Thimphu 
Structure Plan, as shared with me by Mr. Rajni Chavda 
himself. Kuensel reports confirm that the draft plan did 
indeed cost the government under 5 million ngultrum 
(Wangdi 2002).When one looks for evidence in the public 
domain, it is also clear that the plan was indeed prepared by 
CCBA as the official consultant appointed by the Royal Govt. 
and is thus acknowledged in the plan document. 
 
Reading the plan document and CCBA‟s website, it also 
appears that the Thimphu Structure Plan is a pre-emptive24 
measure to tackle the city‟s growing pains. But in fact, when 
we go back to the beginning of the beginnings, we can see 
                                              
24“Unserviceable, fragmented, low-density development characterizes 
the city‟s present growth. The Royal Government is cognizant of 
what is happening, and in its wisdom it is taking action to plan a 
better future” (MoWHS 2004: 2) 
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that the story is quite different; TSP is better interpreted as a 
retrospective measure to control unplanned developments in 
the periphery. This also confronts us with a very different 
conception of how decision-making occurs for policy-makers. 
The TSP was not a planned solution of a single man to a well-
defined problem. Instead, there was a coupling of the problem 
stream (city‟s peripheral developments) with the solution 
stream (the visiting architect-planner) and a window of 
opportunity was open (funding for urban infrastructure and 
extension of city boundary) for these to come together and 
amalgamate into the TSP.  
 
As for the politics stream, which remains missing from this 
analysis, one is right to be suspicious about the plan working 
to serve other interests, particularly of the officials involved. 
But unfortunately, the evidence remains blurry and the 
conclusion one can safely draw is that there may have 
certainly been instances of policy corruption, where some 
influential people‟s land remained outside or inside the 
boundary depending on whether the purpose was to avoid 
urban tax or get municipal services; there may have also been 
instances where some of the involved officials‟ land was 
classified x and not z, for example, as “Guided Land 
Development” instead of “Land Pooling” which would reduce 
their land contribution – in fact I did observe this randomly in 
the Hejo-Samteling LAP, where amongst the small section of 
area classified as “Guided Land Development” was also the 
plot of a former Deputy Minister. While there is grounded 
reason for suspicion, there is simply no evidence to confirm it. 
One also wonders why one of the most important resorts in 
Bhutan remains outside the urban boundary today and does 
not pay a single Ngultrum in urban land tax. As 
demonstrated in a later section, record keeping and 
institutional memory is so poor that it is almost impossible to 
go back in time and verify such details. 
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Another reason why evidence gathering is difficult is because 
once the consultants were hired, the decision-making process 
became increasingly closed. The decision-making authority 
lay with a small clique of bureaucrats25 and anyone with an 
opinion different from the consultants was not heard. This is 
the interpretation of those who were excluded but was shared 
with me by at least two different sources, both with relevant 
technical expertise and holding official positions in the 
government at the time (25/03/2014, 22/01/2014).The 
official version however is that before being approved by the 
Cabinet in 2003, the TSP was thoroughly discussed with the 
public giving evidence of nineteen public consultation 
meetings (TSP 2003) but number alone is not evidence of the 
quality of the consultations. 
 
In conclusion, politics surely shaped the plan in decisions 
over the details, but the plan itself was not an idea born out 
of motivated strategic action but of a combination of people, 
resources and circumstances. In other words, as the plan 
proceeded, those who saw or could create the opportunities to 
personally gain would have quite likely done so through 
strategic action, but at its inception, there was an absence of 
clearly defined goals – quite contrary to my initial hypothesis.  
 
This detour was important because to understand if TSP is a 
case of design misfit or not, we need to go to the moment of 
inception to see who created it and why. Now that we have 
covered the agenda-setting context, we can move to the plan 
objectives. 
 
                                              
25 Possibly including those acknowledged (MoWHS 2004 : 2) - 
Deputy  Minister,  the  Director  General,  the mayor  of  Thimphu,  
the  Senior  Planner,  and  Urban  Designer  of  the  Department  of  
Urban Development  and  Housing (DUDH). 




Every plan has distaste for something which it seeks to 
reorganize into its version of order. In Thimphu‟s case, the 
problem was defined as “spotty growth” or “patchy sprawl” 
(MoWHS 2004: 2). As the plan document describes, pockets of 
Thimphu were growing in a scattered and ad hoc manner as 
in Babesa and Taba. They were not large or dense enough to 
be linked to a network of city services. So the objective of the 
plan was essentially to channel the growth into serviceable, 
dense and compact settlements.  
 
Based on Thimphu‟s land use at the time (see table below), a 
new pattern of medium- and high-density dwelling units was 
proposed. This was mainly in anticipation of future land 
shortage that could arise with projected population growth. It 
was also felt that 3.4% area used for roads was too little 
compared to a normative figure of 20%. Given that half of the 
city area must be protected as green area (slopes, river basins 
etc.) it was proposed that area allocated to roads should 
increase to 10% (MoWHS 2004: 48). Finally, it was felt that 
too little land was used for commercial and industrial 
activities and pressure on the urban core needed to be 
deflected. Consequently, two urban hubs were proposed as 
counter magnets, one each in the north and south of the city 
(MoWHS 2004: 54).  An Urban Hub would have all facilities of 
a Neighbourhood Node. In addition, it would have 
entertainment  facilities  such  as  cinema  halls,  bowling  
alleys,  restaurants,  bars,  discos,  etc.  The automobile 
repair workshop was relocated from the Urban Core or city 
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Table 10: Land use in Thimphu before 2003 




Water body 2.3% 
Brownfield (23%) 






Defense  6.7% 





Vacant (mostly govt. owned) 7.2% 
Data unavailable 4.8% 
 Total = 2613 ha  100% 
Source: MoWHS 2004: 48 (TSP Table 3.1) 
 
Although the plan was made prior to the application of the 
screening tool, it is a very good fit with Bhutan‟s GNH 
philosophy as evident from its principles of Intelligent 
Urbanism (see annex). 
Main tools to coordinate land use with building density 
The TSP is a 258 page document and it sets up a complex 
vocabulary for proposed action. Most planners I met haven‟t 
actually read the full document but refer to it as and when 
needed. There are two types of land use plans that should be 
distinguished to avoid confusion. Finally there is a separate 
document called Development Control Regulations 2004 which 
specifies building regulations for each category of precinct (to 
match a defined land use with building density).    




Based on several types of geographical analyses, the plan 
identifies suitable land uses and population densities for 
different areas in the city classified into precincts or zones. 
Based on its locational attributes, an area is designated a 
function as well as density. The Precinct Plan regulates land 
use primarily by controlling density and building activity 
(number of floors, plot coverage and so on). One example of a 
precinct category is E-1 corresponding to the stretch of land 
running immediately along the river (30 m buffer) classified 
as an ecologically sensitive precinct where building activity 
should be prevented to protect the river basin. Similarly, 
mountainsides with a slope above 30% are not deemed 
suitable for construction and suggested to be better used as 
orchards are given a different category of precinct (E-4).  
 
As there is an environmental justification to avoid risks of 
deforestation, landslides, soil erosion, floods etc, so there is a 
cultural justification to preserve sanctity buffers around areas 
of heritage value compiled into an inventory in the plan. 
These include sites of religious importance as well as 
historical public buildings and royal properties. It also 
includes old settlements classified as the “Traditional Village” 
(TV) precinct. Each precinct comes attached with a set of 
building regulations codified in the Development Control 
Regulations (DCR) for Thimphu 2004).  The DCR defines what 
and how much one can build in a given category of precinct. 
Essentially then, the plan is about controlling development 
activity. Although it does not separate the city on a traditional 
zoning method, it is also very similar to the idea of zoning as 
it sorts areas into activities such as heritage, religious;  
sports, recreation; trade and commerce; to governance; 
residential urban villages, etc. Residential areas fall in the 
Urban Village (UV) precinct category of varying densities. 
Specific examples of precincts categories include 
Neighbourhood Node (NN), Heritage (H), Traditional Village 
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(TV), Urban Core (UC), Urban Hub (UH) and so on. See Annex 
for a complete list of 22 precincts designated in the TSP. 
Proposed Precinct Plan. Source: TSP (MoWHS 2004: 164) 
Local Area Plans 
While all of the 26 sq km within the municipal boundary has 
a defined precinct use, only about 12.1 sq km falls under the 
first set of Local Area Plans (LAP). In the map below, there are 
12 LAPs (coloured in white). Most of them try to prospectively 
plan green-field areas of the Thimphu valley. These are the 
extended areas and fall to the north and south of the brown-
field settlements in the centre. These unplanned areas were 
incorporated into the city after the municipal boundary was 
extended in 1999. The white areas in the middle correspond 
to the Core Area LAP and the Changzamtog LAP26 where 
building activity preceded Local Area Planning but most LAPs 
in the north and south are green-field areas formerly used as 
paddy fields.   
                                              
26 Changzamtog was the first LAP approved in 2001 & Land Pooling 
was experimented the first time.   
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Areas under Local Area Plan (LAP) in white (TCC ca 2009) 
 
The land use in different parts of a given LAP is pre-defined 
by the Precinct Plan. The whole exercise of Local Area 
Planning is to reconfigure all the plots within it in such a way 
that each plot has access to municipal infrastructure and 
services. In order to do that, land for public facilities is 
acquired through Land Pooling (called land adjustment in 
other contexts). Land Pooling is a method by which each 
landowner has to contribute up to 25-30% of his land parcel 
in exchange for a smaller but developed parcel of land that 
may be in a different location but in the same LAP. Land 
pooling saves money for the government as no compensation 
rates have to be paid but it requires the Local Area Planner to 
invest time and get at least a two-third majority of 
landowners to agree to land pooling. With that agreement in 
hand, he then proceeds to adjust and regularize shapes of all 
plots in a way that each plot is connected to a road, water 
supply, drains etc.  
 
Each LAP covers, on average, an area of 1 sq km comprising 
150-400 landowners (Norbu ca 2014). LAPs are separated by 
natural boundaries like streams. The aim is to develop each 
LAP area into a dense, compact settlement connected to a 
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Neighbourhood Node (another category of precinct, NN) where 
neighbourhood services like shops, markets, school, 
healthcare etc. are available at a walking distance. All 
Neighbourhood Nodes are linked up together via the transport 
corridor. Because there is also a separate precinct plan for 
the entire city, precincts allocated to green and heritage uses 
automatically fall inside LAP boundaries. In this way each 
LAP also has a dedicated area of green and open spaces.  
Development Control Regulations 2004 
The DCR is another lengthy document and it matches 
building type with precinct. It specifies for example, the 
number of storeys permitted in a given category of precinct, 
and the plot coverage area. It also regulates building design 
and architecture and finally lays out the procedure for 
obtaining building permits.   
4.2 Plan implementation: Increased precinct 
densities 
The previous section clarified the aims and tools of the plan. 
We can now turn to how the plan is fairing in terms of 
implementation.  
 
The present status of planning in the extended areas is that 
most LAPs have been approved but infrastructure provision 
has not kicked off everywhere, especially where infrastructure 
funding is not readily available. 10 of the 12 LAPs were 
approved between 2004 and 2008 of which 6 are under 
implementation (Norbu ca 2014). These include Lungtenphu, 
Simtokha, Babesa and Changbangdu in the South (ADB 
financing) and Dechencholing and Langjophakha in the north 
(World Bank financing). Core Area was approved directly by 
the Cabinet in 2003 and Changzamtog, approved in 2001 as 
it was the first LAP experiment preceding TSP. 
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Most LAPs have been approved during or before 2008 by the 
city committee. However, during my research stay, I noticed 
that some LAP planners continued to make minor plot 
adjustments as and when a landowner approached them. 
Revisions like plot swapping can be done without touching 
the overall LAP. To get a sense of change overtime, one would 
have to go through a series of internal letters and government 
notifications authorizing revisions as there is not a systematic 
record of old and revised plans; most planners work on their 
digital plan as if it is a living document, making 
readjustments without saving an old copy. This makes the 
task of tracing deviations extremely difficult, more so because 
there is a high staff attrition rate. The planners I interacted 
with have been working since 2009, 2011 and even 2013, 
with little institutional memory of what happened before due 
to poor handing-over processes. One of them along with his 
friend in another division was applying for higher studies in 
Australia and will probably be gone this year.  
 
Therefore, to maintain some replicability of my research, I use 
data from the 2008 Planning audit carried out by the Ministry 
for the Thimphu City Corporation (MoWHS 2008). In this 
document, we can find evidence that some “structured 
aspects of the city, which are not negotiable components of 
the urban structure” such as Neighbourhood Nodes (TCC 
2013), have in fact been negotiated; in one case to an extent 
where the Neighbourhood Node has disappeared altogether. 
The extent of deviations from the original structure plan 
would be even higher if we accounted for the last six years 
after the Audit of 2008 - which I have not incorporated in 
respect for researcher rules on data validity. The general 
pattern is that the sanctity of the Precinct Plan could not be 
maintained, due to public pressures to convert low density 
precincts into higher density. The following section gives 
evidence from the Audit Report and provides the main 
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precinct categories where deviations were already present as 
of March 2008. 
Evidence of precinct changes 
i) Neighbourhood Nodes (Precinct NN)   
All urban villages are supposed to have their own 
Neighbourhood Node which has facilities like a commercial 
centre, neighbourhood clinic and primary school, taxi stand, 
bus stop, postal agency, public toilets as well as space for 
infrastructure maintenance (store for recyclable wastes, 
electrical sub-station, water supply monitoring and 
complaint/bill receipt cell). The idea is that every facility is 
available at walking distance. The approximate size of a 
Neighbourhood Node is calculated to be 2 hectares (4.9 acres) 
(or 494.211 decimals). However, the audit report noted that in 
the Babesa LAP, only one 31 decimal27 plot was earmarked 
for neighbourhood services, i.e. all but 6.27% of this precinct 
had been allotted to private plots in the readjustment 
process. While Lungtenphu LAP had the best performance on 
this (3.80 acres), other LAPs had retained some land, but less 
than the ideal 5 acres e.g. Langjophakha (1.13 acres), Hejo-
Samtenling (2.53 acres) and Taba (1.90 acres).  
ii) Environment protected zones (Precinct E)  
Similarly, encroachment of private plots (UV2 in light pink) 
can be seen on the Forest Environment precinct (E2 in dark 
green) in the Changbangdu LAP. According to the TSP, E2 
precinct is devoted to natural forest preserves in the “no 





                                              
27 1 decimal = 40.46 sq m 
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Source: Image shared by LAP Planner in email dated 4 April 2014 
 
With regards to the 30m buffer zone protecting river-edges, 
the audit found that this protected zone had been encroached 
in non-LAPs but also few LAPs. Although existing structures 
with an approval are permitted, no new development is 
supposed to be permissible. However, in the Lungtenphu LAP, 
all waterfront areas had been fully developed by private 
individuals. In the Ngabe Rong Chhu Green Belt, construction 
activities and paving of surfaces was noted both in the 
workshop area as well outside the southern municipal 
boundary. The 30 m buffer zone in the Chhubachhu Stream 
Green Belt had been reduced to 15 m by a government order28 
dated 3/1/2006.  
 
Similarly, some fauna zones protected by the precinct plan 
had been converted. In the south, the Babesa marshland had 
been exposed to sand extraction (MoWHS 2008: 19). The 
report noted that due to public pressure this area‟s precinct 
was changed to UV2 to permit development activities. In the 
                                              





    Figure 12: Plot spills onto Forest Environment Precinct 
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north, the stream had been diverted for land reclamation and 
the land had been allotted to BAF for developing an archery 
range, legalized by government notification29 dated 4/3/2008. 
iii) Open and Green Spaces (Precincts G and E)  
Most LAPs had not kept space for parks. For example the 
Taba Community Park was not retained because it was 
increasing the land pooling share of the landowners. Part of 
the Hejo Paddy Fields Reserve had been allotted to the new 
Supreme Court Building (approved by the government). Half 
of the Changzamtok-Changbangdu Community park was 
covered by a truck parking. The Hejo Community Park had 
been retained in the plan but was partly taken over by the 
monk body (Dratshang) for development of a printing press. 
The City Central Park, planned to the east of the road going 
from ChubaChhu to Tashichho Dzong fell in an area under 
royal property. 
 
The TSP heavily emphasizes the “pedestrian movement 
system” because pedestrian paths serve multiple functions 
including mobility, open spaces and buffers. Green and open 
spaces are proposed to be interlinked in a network of 
pathways including riverside paths, city peripheral paths and 
transverse link pathways. These pathways also act as buffer 
lines; for example, the city peripheral pathway as the buffer 
line between the urban area and the forest; the river pathway 
as a boundary for the river buffer precinct and so on. This 
complex network of pathways is also to be linked to 
residential areas via the neighbourhood nodes as well as to 
heritage sites and other wilderness areas. (MoWHS 2004: 
107). However, signs of such an elaborate footpath system are 
not evident yet. One cannot simply walk along the river as 
there is no seamless access. My observation was that 
pedestrian movement remains confined to the roads, which 
                                              
29 MoWHS/2/571 
Thimphu Structure Plan 
73 
 
have footpaths in the core area (primarily due to intensive 
investments in 2008 for the royal coronation ceremony (TCC 
2010a) but not in northern areas like Langjophakha.    
iv) Heritage Precincts (Precinct H)  
TSP proposed that sites of heritage importance should also 
have a buffer of open space around them and vehicular 
access should be permitted only up to a point at a reasonable 
distance (MoWHS 2004: 137) in order to enhance their 
prominence. The idea was to link the pedestrian access to 
these heritage sites in the city with the open space pathway 
system mentioned before. Some 65 km of heritage walks are 
proposed in the plan (MoWHS 2004: 139, Table 4.7) and also 
routes charted for heritage drives. This would require some 
efforts in landscaping, signage and small development works. 
As of 2008, none of these walks had been initiated except for 
some footpath and park space around Lungten Zampa - 
which was possibly a spill-over effect of improvements made 
to the Sunday Vegetable Market in preparation for the 2008 
royal Centennial and Coronation Ceremony (TCC 2010).  
v) Traditional Villages (Precinct TV)   
Although the preserved old structures in the “Traditional 
Village” precinct of the LAPs provide aesthetic respite to the 
eye in a landscape of mushrooming new buildings, it poses 
much discomfort for the residents living there. Many of them 
want to renovate their buildings and capture rental incomes 
as their neighbours are doing. However, the precinct 
classification of their plot, although saved them from land 
pooling, prevents them from constructing. Although TSP 
proposals include an artist‟s village at the Babesa traditional 
village, currently the very concept of TV precinct is under 
review (Interviews 17/02/2014). Flooded with building 
applications from owners residing in TV precinct, TCC wrote a 
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letter30 in September 2010 to the two relevant Ministries 
(MoHCA and MoWHS) and the Office of Gyalpoi Zimpon in the 
His Majesty‟s secretariat office seeking for policy directives, 
and hesitantly asking if they should convert the TV precinct 
to the residential UV2 precinct (TCC 2010). The issue as I 
understand is that owners need to be given incentives if 
development is to be frozen.  
vi) Urban Villages (Precinct UV) 
This is a residential precinct where landowners are allowed to 
build but of varying building densities – UV1, UV2 etc. The 
building height is regulated by the Development Control 
Regulations (DCR) 2004 attached to the TSP. Although 
property owners in UV precincts are allowed to build, many 
want to build more as there are many requests in the meeting 
minutes for precinct changes in order to increase permissible 
building height. There was a rule revision in 2011 (amongst 
the first initiatives of the mayor) which allowed attics to be 
converted into a full floor after approval was gained directly 
from the Prime Minister. Previously attics were not permitted 
as habitable spaces although they were being used as such in 
many buildings. The revision technically contradicts the 
Precinct Plan in terms of the number of floors permitted in 
each precinct by adding an extra storey everywhere, 
increasing the density and infrastructure requirements. It 
also raises other issues for example, when a 4-storeyed 
building regularizes its attic, the building rules require that 
all buildings above 4 floors to provide an elevator (Interview 
10/01/2014, DCR 2004, BBR 2002). My observation was that 
this is not the case and very few such buildings have 
elevators and it was observed that the Implementation and 
Monitoring Section of TCC treats this as a non-issue, contrary 
to the seriousness attached to this by the Ministry.  
                                              
30 Letter vide 22/UPD/TCC/General/2010-11/ 
Thimphu Structure Plan 
75 
 
4.3 Analysis of deviations: Case by case 
exemption 
Now that we have a fair idea of what are the planning rules 
prescribed by the TSP and which are the ones most 
vulnerable to non-compliance, we can proceed to characterize 
the nature of these deviations.  
Rule revisions as the negotiated outcome 
The principle argument proposed is that the mechanism of 
deviations from the precinct plan was authorization of these 
deviations either by rule revision or regularization of an 
individual anomaly. Sometimes precinct changes were 
sanctioned from above by some government body‟s orders, 
thus overruling precinct plan for a small part of the city. 
Sometimes, rules were modified as in the attic case. Thus the 
plan deviations are not always legal violations nor involve a 
blatant form of corruption. Instead, they fall in the realm of 
exception-making, whether through authorization on case by 
case basis or rule revisions. 
 
Individual negotiation played quite a prominent role. 
Sometimes rules were considered for revision due to public 
pressure. Sometimes, the landowner insisted on plot 
readjustment and as there was no other vacant place 
available; green and open spaces were encroached in the LAP 
itself, as is the case in the Babesa LAP and also the 
Changbangdu LAP. When rules were not enforced, 
development preceded monitoring; later the preferable option 
was authorization rather than demolition. Sometimes it is 
lack of monitoring or ignorance as new constructions in the 
river buffer zones are still coming up.  
 
According to the Audit Report of 2008, the major 
shortcomings faced by the TCC were identified as a) a result 
of short-sighted solutions of the past, b) lack of motivation to 
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the staffs and c) co-ordination problems. It identified limited 
organizational capacity as the core issue constraining plan 
implementation. As of 2013 the whole of Bhutan had 10 
professionally trained urban planners, trained in the last 
decade (Norbu ca 2014). When the TSP was being prepared, 
only 2 officials were trained as planners. The audit report also 
reveals that other divisions of TCC had no idea about the 
TSP. Furthermore, the TCC office was scattered in four 
locations and some divisions did not even have internet 
facilities (MoWHS 2008). So organizational capacity was 
certainly an issue in 2008 and although the present status is 
not glamorous, there have been significant improvements. 
Particularly, with the mayor coming in 2011, emphasis has 
been given to improve service delivery and his personal 
involvement on the field helps settle disputes faster. 
 
Although capacity is recognized as an issue, it is not the main 
point of focus in this study, which instead zooms onto 
negotiation strategies. It certainly led to a situation where 
developments were not monitored and preceded planning, 
especially in ecological zones where land was owned privately. 
All this time it took TCC to get its act together, people 
constructed; and today the city is legalizing some 
unauthorized structures for a nominal amount of 
regularization fees. (See meeting 1, Agenda 2). Thus capacity 
is incorporated as a factor, but individual negotiation is the 
predominant mode of deviation.  
Individual cases vs. General issues discussed at town meeting 
This interpretation can be further corroborated by the TCC 
town committee meeting minutes. Property owners are 
negotiating at several levels. Negotiation during land 
readjustment process for either plot relocation or favourable 
precinct use (higher building heights); or reduction of land 
pooling contribution in exchange for a much lower monetary 
“betterment charge”. Betterment charges in lieu of land 
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pooling also squeeze out the amount of land available for 
public purposes. It also appears that the city committee 
spends quite a substantial amount of time adjudicating on 
individual disagreements between the planner and the 
landowner. For example, in meeting 2 held on 15 April 2011, 
out of the total 33 agendas discussed, 7 were internal 
organizational issues. Of the remaining 26, 11 were cases of 
individual plot owners or building owners. 
 











15-04-2011 11 7 15 33 
Remark: Sometimes a set of many plots is discussed but this is 
counted as one agenda item (eg. situation of 18 plot owners in one). 
So actual number of individual cases is an under-estimation. 
Types of claims 
An analysis of individual issues discussed in the 18 Thimphu 
town committee meetings from 2011 to 2013 reveals the 
following. Deviations from the precinct plan can happen 
either because direct demands of precinct changes for specific 
areas are made. This happens for example, if a plot owner(s) 
perceives that the topography of his/her plot is not very 
different from an adjacent precinct which may have higher 
density use (one extra floor). But apart from direct demands, 
precinct plan deviations can also happen because of claims 
made in related or proximate “fields”, particularly, those 
relating to the building section and the land management 
section of the city corporation.  
 
Precinct change demands from Building Division: For 
example if a builder‟s request to build or authorize a 
structure that is not compatible with the precinct (e.g. 4 
storeys in a low density precinct originally permitting 3 
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storeys) is accepted, then the precinct plan is automatically 
violated. 
 
Precinct change demands from Land Division: Any 
requests for plot adjustments in the LAP may also impact the 
Precinct Plan. For example, when a private plot is allotted in a 
green space precinct and later private owner applies for a 
building permit. Or for example, precinct changes may be 
necessitated due to revisions in the cadastral map, as is the 
case in Thimphu since 2007.  
Who are the claim-makers? 
The claim-maker here is not only the individual landowner 
but anybody who proposes a claim against implementation of 
a planning code. It includes a) Landowner (individual, 
individual as an institution or individuals represented as a 
group) b) the planner himself, either bringing up a „technical‟ 
matter or on behalf of the citizen whose grievance he is 
unable to settle at a personal level. c) Claims also come from 
the people‟s representatives like the mayor or local councillors 
in the town committee. Occasionally, claims also come from 
other government authorities like the National Land 
Commission (NLC) or from the Cabinet. In all cases, the 
original planning rule is being challenged through a specific 
framing. This is described in detail in the subsequent 
chapters.  
4.4 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to be precise about the rules 
under scrutiny and characterize the nature of deviations. The 
finding was that rules of the Precinct Plan (which freezes land 
use and building density) have been deviated. This has 
resulted in more development in low density precincts leading 
to a horizontal spread of built-up activity. At the same time, 
there is also a degree of vertical outgrowth particularly when 
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individual builders demand a change of precincts in order to 
increase permissible building heights. Notably, the 
abolishment of the attic rules in 2011 has added one 
additional floor to all buildings in Thimphu. After 
understanding what the TSP is all about, one can also bring 
to understand how one deviation leads to another like a mini 
domino effect: if an ecological buffer zone or neighbourhood 
node is encroached upon by private buildings, it disrupts the 
mobility network and system of pathways and thus the 
interconnectedness of the plan breaks down.   
 
The principal reason for the plan‟s deviations is attributed to 
a high degree of flexibility on the part of the implementing 
authorities to accommodate individual complaints. This is a 
very different argument from the usual critiques levelled at 
the urban planning exercise, directed at a single 
authoritarian planner who imposes his aspirations onto the 
city or at the government for facilitating displacement of 
landowners by acquiring their land for new developments. 
Because planning in the extended urban areas has depended 
on the instrument of Land Pooling, the above mentioned 
critique is not applicable to Thimphu; original titleholders 
lose a part and not all of their land. The final outcome is thus 
a negotiated compromise between the original planning rule 
and the landowners. The next chapter looks at why and how 
precinct deviations were authorized.  
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V. Planning Governance: Actors & their 
Interests 
This chapter maps the network of actors involved in the 
“governance” of urban planning in Thimphu. Here 
“governance” is taken as a much broader concept than 
“government” in order to include all those 
actors/organizations who have policy influence on the TSP. 
Deriving from the community power debate and critiques of 
institutionalism in the 1960s-70s, it is assumed that there 
will be actors outside the formal governing structure who will 
have some influence in shaping municipal decision-making. 
After mapping all the actors involved in the governance 
(beyond government) of urban planning in Thimphu, we move 
on to examine how their “field position” (position in the 
governance network) shapes their interests in rule compliance 
or rule deviations from the vantage point of their identity in 
the governance network. This chapter is divided into three 
parts, each one covers the range of actors involved across the 
spectrum from the state, citizens to the market.  
 
The figure below provides a simple illustration of the most 
proximate fields (actors/organizations) involved in the 
governance of urban planning in Thimphu. The locus of the 
network is the Thimphu City Corporation (TCC), which is the 
main body in charge of implementing the plan. We explain 
briefly the roles of all field players within this governance 
network and then go on to argue that players‟ field positions 
shape their identities and basic interests in following or not 
the planning rules. Identifying these tension points gives us a 
better sense of the pressure from outside and inside the TCC 
to push building practices off the road codified in the 




5.1 State authorities: City Corporation & 
Central agencies 
TCC as an organization internally differentiated 
We start with the Thimphu City Corporation (TCC) as the 
central point in the governance network and show that it is 
itself divisible into smaller fields which generate conflicts and 
pressure to make the rules more flexible, notably from the 
elected members, as they have to represent the tribulations of 
the landowners. On the other hand, civil servants staffing the 
Urban Planning Division displayed a tendency to comply with 
the TSP as per the original version.  
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As the local government, TCC is the implementing agency of 
programmes and plans of MoWHS including the TSP. Local 
Area Planning is the primary mandate of TCC, in terms of 
getting land pooling consent from landowners. TCC has the 
power to revise rules and regulations but not policies as per 
the recent decentralization laws. The Local Area Planner is 
the key person taking decisions at the ground level, and when 
he is unable to settle disputes, he forwards the matter to the 
mayor and puts it up for discussion in the town committee. 
When issues cannot be settled at the city level, which can 
happen when institutions like the monastic body are involved, 
the matter is forwarded to the Ministry (MoWHS), the Cabinet 
headed by the Prime Minister and sometimes to the His 
Majesty‟s secretariat office31. TCC is staffed with civil servants 
who report to an elected mayor since 2011.  
 
The first local government elections were held in 2011 in 
accordance with the 2009 Local Government Act which 
supersedes the Bhutan Municipal Act (BMA) of 1999. As a 
result, Thimphu is now governed by the City Council 
(Thromde Tshogdu). The members consist of one elected 
Mayor (Thrompon) who was previously appointed and one 
Executive Secretary appointed by the Government as well as 
7 elected councillors from respected areas. The mayor heads 
the town committee composed of 8 elected local councillors 
including himself as well as an appointed Executive Secretary 
(civil servant). This committee is the main decision-making 
authority when landowners put up their grievances. However 
the number of registered voters is very small: 6226. This is 
because only those having a census in Thimphu are eligible to 
vote. According to the 2005 Census, Thimphu city had a 
population of 79,185 out of which only 25,205 (31.8%) are 
born in Thimphu. From Chapter I, we also know that about 
42% of the population is aged nineteen and below. From this 
                                              




we can estimate that only about 14,618 would be the eligible 
voter base as long as people keep their census in the region of 
Bhutan where they are born.  
 
Consequently, in this city of migrants – only 1335 voted for 
the winning candidate in the 2011 elections, whereas the 
resident population in Thimphu is currently around 130,000.  
As only those holding a census in Thimphu are allowed to 
vote, we can also assume that a majority of these voters own 
property in Thimphu as the rate of land ownership in Bhutan 
is high due to His Majesty‟s kidu policy. A 2012 Survey notes 
that about 8 in 10 rural households (84%) own land (ADB-
NSB 2013: 59). As a result elected members represent the 
interests of those holding a census in Thimphu (landowning 
class) and not the tenants which form the majority of 
residents. 
 
After the 2011 elections, new pressures are emerging to revise 
some of the original concepts codified in the TSP such as 
“traditional village” settlements, building regulations codified 
in the DCR 2004, Attic Rules 2009. This pressure to make 
revisions to the original plan comes from two sources a) 
people‟s representatives in the committee as their voters are 
mostly landowners with an interest in developing their 
properties. b) The second source of pressure to adapt the 
rules comes from bureaucrats working in the divisions 
notably when they discover a gap in the rules or resistance 
from landowners and are unable to proceed with 
implementation. Often issues are raised in fields proximate to 
the planning division, notably the building division (DCD) and 
the land division (LMS). Addressal of their issues spills over to 
create changes in the precinct plan under the planning 
division (UPD), very much in the way Fligstein observed that 
changes in one field induce changes in other proximate fields. 
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TCC vs. other government organizations 
TCC is in a relation of dependence with most other 
government authorities with overlapping jurisdictions. In 
preparation for recent democratic reforms – a lot of new 
institutional restructuring was initiated, for example, 
centralizing all land management issues and charging it to 
the National Land Commission (NLC).  
i) Ministry of Works and Human Settlements (MoWHS):  
The Ministry is in charge of urban affairs in the country and 
is responsible for policy making in urban areas. Although in 
principle, it is the department of local government in the 
Ministry of Culture and Home Affairs that oversees local 
governments, in practice it is the MoWHS monitoring 
activities of urban local governments. The Ministry is 
composed mainly of bureaucrats trained as engineers and led 
by the Secretary reporting to the Minister who until 2008 was 
also a senior member of the civil service. MoWHS (formerly 
the Ministry of Communication) is in charge of interacting 
with donors and consultants providing technical expertise 
and was the key office overseeing the preparation of the 
Thimphu Structure Plan (TSP). One of the Senior Planners I 
interviewed in the Ministry was closely involved in the 
drafting of the TSP and his main interest therefore is in 
ensuring that the rules are followed as codified in the original 
TSP. However with recent developments in the 
decentralization process, the details of urban planning are 
increasingly left to other authorities like the Thimphu City 
Corporation (TCC) and the National Land Commission (NLC) 
on land management issues. In my interviews I sensed a 
disappointment that planning is increasingly being left to 
“unprofessionals” (Interview with Senior Planner). The 
message was that those who are not trained as planners, like 
elected members in the city committee or bureaucrats from 




own issues and interests and end up compromising the 
quality of the plan. 
 
In the context of decentralization of authority to local 
governments, local area planning is now a mandate of the 
local authority. As per the Local Government Act 2009, local 
governments can modify rules and regulations but the 
Ministry retains its function for policy making. This has 
created some confusion, for example, with respect to 
modification of Thimphu‟s Development Control Regulations 
(DCR) 2004 which specifies building codes as per land use 
defined in the Thimphu Structure Plan. While TCC has 
proposed to revise the DCR, the MoWHS has remained 
reluctant. According to interviews with members in the TCC 
Development Control divisions, MoWHS lacks the staff 
capacity to revise the rules but does not want/trust TCC to 
do it by themselves. Although DCR revision was stuck, with 
building pressures within TCC to revise it, we may soon 
expect a revision. MoWHS therefore is like the lone watch-
guard of the TSP, the only one around with a strong interest 
in having the rules applied, since it is them who made the 
plan. If TCC was not in a relation of dependence, rule revision 
would have proceeded at a much faster rate. Currently this is 
slowed in getting approvals from the Ministry.   
ii) NLC 
Finally there are other government bodies that have some 
capacity to influence decision-making on urban planning. The 
biggest intervening authority is the National Land Commission 
(NLC) as authority over land issues has been centralized with 
the 2007 Land Act. NLC is yet another channel available to 
plot owners in case of inability to negotiate with TCC. From 
the view of the Ministry, NLC‟s role is only to keep land 
records and not intervene in how land readjustments are 
made by the planner. In practice however, NLC has played a 
very important role in governance of land in Thimphu and in 
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Bhutan, as evident from its role in annulling the very high 
profile Education City Project (Lamsang 2014). The NLC 
secretary is appointed by His Majesty and remains a powerful 
institution and has overruling powers over TCC. In fact, TCC 
has decided to approach the Attorney General‟s Office (AGO) 
(See Meeting 17) to clarify the autonomy of its powers. NLC‟s 
interests are in ensuring that no violations of the Land Act 
are made (breach of minimum and maximum ceiling of land 
ownership for example). NLC has been involved in a major 
project of revamping the cadastral survey (one of its main 
responsibilities as part of Land Act 2007). This created huge 
issues because the original Local Area Plans of the TSP were 
made as per the last cadastral survey so correction of areas 
with excess and deficit land created delay in plan 
implementation and continue to pop up as claims from 
landowners.  
iii) NEC and other government agencies 
Other government authorities involved include the Ministry of 
Finance (MoF) with the Department of National Properties 
under it to calculate the values of land through Property 
valuation agency (PAVA of the government. Then there is also 
the National Environment Commission (NEC) to coordinate 
development control in environment precincts and the 
Ministry of Home and Cultural Affairs (MOHCA) to consult on 
changes to Heritage Precincts. Similarly there may be others 
that need to be consulted in cases of overlapping mandates. 
In that sense, pressure to maintain the rules also comes from 
this lack of autonomy as any rule revisions have to be made 
with permission. Vice versa, multiplicity of authority also 
creates a situation of non-compliance, as these central 
agencies can overrule the TSP. The whole process of state-
building, rationalization and institutionalization process has 
been central to responsibility sharing over TSP and sight of 
this fact should not be lost with the policy of decentralization. 




has been centralization of some functions including land 
management to NLC. The TCC remains thoroughly embedded 
in the broader state field.  
 
At the same time, the same embeddedness also creates 
pressures for rule deviation. It is therefore not uncommon 
that pressures for plan deviation to be generated from other 
government departments in their horse-vision like focus on 
implementing other rules more important to them. For 
example, recently, the NEC has put to question the creation 
on an automobile workshop in the northern hub which was 
originally in the TSP. NEC questions this from  a point of view 
of pollution to the river whereas the plan was trying to 
diversify density from the Urban Core area. Thus, when some 
other rule is a priority, TSP goes down the order of 
importance. The sole guardian of the TSP really is the MoWHS 
but that‟s because they made the plan and they still have a 
staff member who cares about the rules. Gone tomorrow, and 
this veto power to rule revision may change.    
iv) NHDCL 
National Housing Development Corporation Limited (NHDCL) 
is officially charged with the mandate of affording housing in 
the country. The TSP had anticipated that demand for 
affordable housing would rise even faster with the city‟s 
growth and advocated that part of the neighbourhood service 
nodes should be used for providing sites for affordable 
housing. While lack of space availability is certainly an issue, 
in one or two sites space has been reserved for affordable 
housing. The problem is that there is no investor and NHDC 
is too busy with its other mandates. Only recently, World 
Bank is considering to invest in a pilot project (Gelay ca 
2014).  
 
The National Housing Development Corporation was set up in 
early 2000s as part of housing finance restructuring in which 
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ADB played an important role. The decision was taken that 
all public housing would be managed by NHDC and since its 
corporatization in 2011, ownership has also been taken over 
from various other government agencies. In my interviews 
with NHDCL staff, I noticed that NHDCL is so bogged down 
with the new task of transferring property ownership, that 
there is simply no one to attend to the needs of affordable 
housing in Thimphu. Also when I interviewed the M.D, it was 
clear that building more stock in Thimphu is clearly not a 
priority a) because at least Thimphu has houses, other towns 
don‟t even have that. Even if they had the funds, the M.D. 
said, they would focus elsewhere (Interview on 1/4/2014). 
NHDC already has a flagship project in Thimphu, the Chang 
jiji housing complex with 767 units.So in a way there is a 
sense that a contribution has already been made. But in fact, 
the housing shortage demand is high as NHDC received over 
1600 applications (1/4/2014 NHDC Real Estate Division) 
whereas exits are less than 30 per year. 
5.2 Citizens: Landowners & People’s 
representatives 
Having covered the multiple organizations and interests in the 
realm of state-state relations, we now move to state-society 
relations.  
i) People‟s representatives 
Apart from the elected local councillors and mayor for urban 
Thimphu, Thimphu district is also a constituency for two 
Members of the Parliament (Lower House), one each from 
North Thimphu and South Thimphu. Currently both MPs are 
from the opposition party, DPT. There is also one member 
representing the Thimphu district in the National Council 
(Upper House). There is a regional government at the district 
level which is more relevant for rural Thimphu than urban 




direct representative of the people. The Cabinet of ten 
Ministers from the ruling party headed by the Prime Minister 
is the highest body in the hierarchy of all elected 
representatives. So democratization has opened new channels 
for people to voice their claims. For example, people taking 
their land issues to the Prime Minister (e.g. Hejo Green Area) 
directly when not resolved at the city level.   
ii) Citizens 
Individuals: As individuals, residents living in the municipal 
boundary are property owners (minority) or tenants 
(majority). Although TCC only invites the landowners to the 
Local Area Planning (LAP) consultation meetings, LAPs also 
affect tenants especially if their structures are affected or if 
higher property values result in a form of displacement or 
gentrification. However, tenants are usually not consulted 
except in impact assessments of donors and IFIs like the 
World Bank and ADB. This is despite the fact that the 
proportion of tenants is very high, for example, over 70% in 
Lower Taba LAP (Thimphu Thromde - Pradhan 2013). 
 
Institutions as residents: A lot of land in Thimphu (about 
15%) is owned by institutions including the army, police, 
royal bodyguard force, monk bodies, the Indian Embassy, 
schools and the hospital. The monk body owns over 200 acres 
alone (Gelay ca 2014: 85). There is also government owned 
land of different Ministries and Departments such as the 
Agricultural Ministry in Babesa, Forestry in the north etc. 
Landowners as institution have much more power to 
negotiate and stall the plan if their property is threatened by 
the plan. For example, the Cabinet has been trying to build a 
diplomatic enclave in Hejo but this requires some 
readjustment in the monk body‟s land which it has not 
agreed with and so the proposal is stuck and hence delayed 
plan (LAP) implementation.  
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5.3 Market: Infrastructure investors & private 
sector 
TCC‟s interaction with this other network is almost nil except 
with the donors. This is to say that even an absence of a tie 
can affect outcomes within a field. This section explains why 
this is the case by exploring actors in state-market 
interactions.  
i) International Financing Institutions  
In urban development in Thimphu, the World Bank and the 
Asia Development Bank (ADB) are the two key actors. 
Towards the end of the 20th century, when the United Nations 
(UNDP/UNCHS32) urban management assistance was coming 
to an end, as was the 1986-2000 strategic plan, new 
programmes funded by the Danish government (DANIDA33), 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank were 
starting. Their investments were not integrated in one plan at 
that stage. DANIDA was going to invest 70M Kroner to 
develop water, sanitation and sewerage facilities as part of the 
UDSSP34 project; ADB was giving US$ 8.2 M ($ 5.7 as loan) to 
develop roads, footpaths and bridges (Gyalmo 1999). The 
World Bank would complement other donors and emphasize 
institutional strengthening at the district and local levels. 
Presently however, the Danish government (DANIDA) who was 
a big player in the 2000s is now packing up and quitting the 
country. Along with DANIDA has gone the grant-based 
funding. Now the ADB and World Bank remain to provide 
upfront costs for infrastructure in the new LAPs. The total 
cost of implementing the TSP was estimated at US$ 90 
million (Wangdi 2003).  
 
                                              
32 United Nations Commission on Human Settlements (UN Habitat) 
33 Danish International Development Agency 




These institutions seem to interact more closely with the 
central government (GNHC, MoWHS) and approach TCC when 
data is needed. When the World Bank conducted a study of 
water supply system in North Thimphu, they were involved 
with the Policy Planning Division of the Ministry. As local 
government was not consulted in plan preparation, some 
confusion was created during implementation.  
 
The main role of these institutions is in providing finance and 
technical expertise. They don‟t usually set the agenda but 
they shape it sometimes by insisting on clarification of rules. 
For example, ADB and World Bank required Land Pooling 
Rules to be codified which were approved in 2009. They also 
insist on 100% land pooling agreements and conduct socio-
economic and environment impact surveys. This puts 
pressure on TCC to get consensus agreements before 
proceeding with planning an area, thus leveraging the power 
of the landowners.  
ii) Private Sector 
Although the private sector‟s role is invisible, its conspicuous 
absence is extremely important. Once the government 
approves the Local Area Plans, it is the private sector which 
has to come forward and invest in infrastructure and 
facilities. While contractors are keen to invest in civil works, 
so far there remains little interest in investment for 
neighbourhood services, or green/open space development. 
As a result of this, these spaces have remained undeveloped 
and vacant. An effect of that has been that when plot owners 
approach Local Area planner for plot readjustment, it is these 
spaces that become the scapegoat and most vulnerable to be 
given away.  
 
On the other hand, there is interest in other types of private 
investment that the plan had not envisaged. For example, 
multi-level parking (IFC), snooker bars, mobile bar, and so 
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on. Many of these requests seek to develop bars in the 
basement but current rules don‟t allow basement to be used 
for purposes other than parking. Thus there is lack of interest 
from private sector to lease land where the TSP planned it 
and more interest in developing commercial uses of properties 
planned for residential use by the TSP.  
5.4 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to show how an 
actor/organization‟s interest in compliance is shaped by its 
position in the governance network of organizations (or fields) 
involved in planning governance. Actor identity & interests 
are determined vis a vis other players in the network. But this 
network of field is itself embedded in a broader state field 
which structures how state-society, state-state and state-
market relations are organized in Bhutan.  An example of the 
first type of embeddedness is that actors‟ location in the field 
network will orient their interests in accordance with their 
field identity - so for example, a landowner is generally likely 
to be more oriented to rule avoidance while the local area 
planner is generally grappling with rule enforcement. 
However, the way broader state-society relations are 
structured in Bhutan will also impact the way landowners 
and city officials interact. 
 
Within the state-state interactions, we saw that there are 
multiple authorities involved which leads to a constant 
undermining of the authority of the Thimphu City 
Corporation. Within state-society relations, we saw that 
pressure against compliance comes from landowners seeking 
to maximize returns from their property with high preference 
for increasing building heights or reducing land pooling. 
Finally, in the realm of state-market relations we saw that 
even when the private sector is absent, the plan is affected. 




Neighbourhood remain vacant as the private sector displays 
little interest in leasing it. As a result, pressure for 
encroachment of private plots on these vacant areas build up. 
Secondly, because the private sector is so weak, the City 
Corporation is dependent on IFIs to invest who insist on 
consensual land pooling. Further, where infrastructure 
finance is not available, LAPs have not been implemented. In 
both ways, compliance is compromised because delayed 
implementation creates opportunities for landowners to 
construct and later seek authorization. 
 
By deconstructing the actors involved, this chapter showed a 
conflict of interest for and against compliance to TSP. Now 
that we understand why compliance is an issue and for 
whom, we move to the last chapter which explains how 
planning deviations are legalized in practice.   
 
In the 2011 elections, the winning candidate received votes 
from only 1% of Thimphu‟s present population as only those 
with registered Census in Thimphu are eligible to vote. We 
saw in Chapter I that only 31.8% of residents are born in 
Thimphu. Where are the others coming from? 8.5% are born 
abroad. Most others have their census in other parts of 
Bhutan, predominantly Eastern Bhutan: Trashigang followed 
by Samtse, Sarpang and Monggar.  
 
Figure 14: Thimphu residents’ origins 
Origins Place of birth   Previous residence 
  No. %   No. % 
Thimphu 25,205 31.8   25,248 31.9 
Trashigang 5,887 7.4   5,138 6.5 
Samtse 3,906 4.9   3,557 4.5 
Sarpang 3,267 4.1   3,728 4.7 
Monggar 3,196 4.0   2,486 3.1 
Wangdue 2,810 3.6   3,204 4.1 
Chhukha 2,766 3.5 
 
5,160 6.5 
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Samdrupjongkhar 2,682 3.4 
 
2,580 3.3 
Lhuentse 2,478 3.1 
 
1,869 2.4 
Paro 2,471 3.1 
 
3,180 4.0 
Trashiyangtse 2,421 3.1 
 
1,778 2.3 
Tsirang 2,356 3.0 
 
1,758 2.2 
Zhemgang 2,244 2.8 
 
1,593 2.0 
Punakha 2,009 2.5 
 
2,541 3.2 
Pemagatshel 1,855 2.3 
 
1,347 1.7 
Dagana 1,620 2.1 
 
1,278 1.6 
Trongsa 1,413 1.8 
 
1,269 1.6 
Bumthang 1,309 1.7 
 
1,410 1.8 
Haa 1,071 1.4 
 
1,222 1.5 
Gasa 125 0.2 
 
121 0.2 
Abroad 6,745 8.5 
 
7,342 9.3 
Not stated 1,349 1.7 
 
1,376 1.7 












VI. Authorization of Deviations: Why & 
How 
Having demonstrated that the plan is evolving constantly, we 
now move to mechanisms through which these changes 
occur. As we have seen in the previous chapter, overruling 
codes of the planning document is a prominent mechanism 
characterizing deviations in the Thimphu Structure Plan 
(TSP). When rules are revised or when an exception is 
authorized, it is worth asking how the original rule lost its 
authority and a deviation became legitimate. This chapter 
deconstructs the mechanisms through which rule breaking is 
authorized. The aim of this chapter is to show how actors 
overcome the constraints of the planning codes. In the overall 
argument, this is about how strategic action really works in 
practice. The chapter deconstructs the strategies of 
negotiation of the various actors involved in the governance 
network.  
 
To analyse how deviations from the original set of rules are 
authorized by the city committee, the chapter proceeds in 
three parts. First we look at gaps and conflicts in the design 
of rules that create the conditions ripe for strategic action. 
The next two sections analyse the tactics or strategies used 
by each claim-makers as well as decision-takers. Claim-
makers are those who point out a flaw with the rules and 
claim that an exception or rule revision be considered. It 
includes landowners but also municipal officials themselves. 
Decision-takers are those who decide whether a claim should 
be accepted and is usually the elected town committee.While 
presenting how veto players challenge the rules of the plan, 
this section also provides an idea of the resource endowments 
of actors that leverage their claim-making powers.  
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This analysis builds on Robert Baldwin‟s critique of Kenneth 
Culp Davis‟s book Discretionary Justice (1971) and Baldwin‟s 
assessment of legitimacy claims made in government 
decision-making. Baldwin‟s argument is that rule clarification 
cannot limit government discretion in decision-making 
because there are multiple paths to make a decision. In other 
words, there is simply no right decision. He identifies five 
rationales or “legitimacy claims” underlying decision-making 
in government (Baldwin 1995: 41) with respect to second 
order rules made by bureaucrats (unlike legislations of the 
parliament). A decision can seek legitimacy in legislatively 
mandated rules or in the assent of authorities to which an 
organization is accountable. Decisions can be justified in the 
interest of individual rights or for efficiency goals. Finally 
decisions can also seek legitimacy in the knowledge of an 
expert.   
 
In this research the typology of legitimacy claims is derived 
purely from the evidence but Baldwin‟s method is used to 
analyse the data in a similar way. The assumption is that 
even when one set of rules is applied to resolve another set, 
there is discretion in terms of which rules to recall and which 
norms to value. Thus the decision-making process is treated 
as a subjective process of interpretation. The main source of 
data used is the city corporation‟s meeting minutes. The 
“field” in focus is the city corporation but of most interest to 
us is to analyse TCC‟s interactions with other “fields” or 
actors that also have a say in the TSP.   
  
It is observed that changes in the original precinct plan result 
from requests not only in the planning division but also the 
building division and the land management sections. 
Individual requests are of at least three types: 
  
a) Direct demands for precinct change  
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b) Requests for authorization of a building structure that 
is incompatible with a given precinct and finally  
c) Requests for plot readjustments which affects the 
precinct proportions in each LAP  
Apart from authorization of individual claims there may also 
be changes at the policy level. These include: 
 
a) Proposals to revise rules originally codified in the TSP 
2003 
b) Revision of rules originally codified in the DCR 2004 
c) Modifications made to approved LAPs 
 
Using these criteria, a smaller sample of total agendas 
discussed in the meetings was extracted. This sample was 
then studied to deconstruct the competing legitimacy claims 
of various actors.  
 
The sample of claims and corresponding decisions that affect 
the original precinct plan either directly or indirectly (through 
the six discussed above) is then analysed in two stages:  
i) Claim-making: Onset of contention  
First we ask, what are the tactics used by claim-makers so 
that an individual‟s case enters the agenda of the town 
committee‟s discussions. The claim-maker here is not only 
the individual landowner but anybody who proposes the 
agenda, most often the planner himself, particularly in cases 
where his readjustment of plots is not acceptable by plot 
owners.  
 
Cautionary note: We should remember that the actual 
number of claims for change (e.g. plot readjustment without 
touching the LAP) may be settled on the field and may not 
enter the meeting discussion. This sample is therefore not 
representative of all the claims in the city; just those that 
cannot be settled at the level of the planner. This could 
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happen if the owner is persistent or if discretion is required 
with respect to which rules to apply. So by definition, sample 
will over-represent those claims where conflicts and gaps in 
rules are most stark. The word of caution is that this is not a 
sample of how claims are settled for the city generally, most of 
which happens on the ground between the planner and plot 
owners.  
ii) Decision-taking: Settlement  
In the second part, I analyse the sample of claims to see how 
many claims for change were accepted and on what official 
grounds were the others rejected. I then proceed to look at 
how deviations were legitimatized, using what alternative 
claims and strategies to secure the deviation as permanent.  
The last part of this chapter thus deconstructs the framings 
used by decision-takers to justify authorization of deviations. 
It extracts the values or legal principles invoked to legitimize 
exception-making. The decision-taker is usually the 
committee comprising elected councillors and the Executive 
Secretary, chaired by the mayor. 
6.1 Why? Gaps and conflicts in rule design 
This section is why claim-makers put planning codes in a 
legitimacy crisis.This section aims to explain why challenging 
of a given rule comes to be recognized as a legitimate claim. 
The answer is that actors use strategic framings to challenge 
the rule‟s legitimacy and make claims for an exception. The 
second part looks at the formats rule challengers use to 
express their claims.  
 
This section tries to describe how some cases enter the 
agenda and become cases of discussion in the town 
committee meetings. The assumption is that surely, there are 
more grievances than those entering the agenda. From my 
discussions with the Local Area Planners, I learnt that the 
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planner plays a very important role as most issues raised by 
landowners are settled at his level. He thus plays a key role in 
the attrition rate of disputes in the early stages usually 
through the “consultation” process where he informs the 
landowners about planning goals. At the beginning this 
process was filled with gaps, sometimes landowners did not 
understand what the readjustment exercise would mean by 
merely looking at a paper plan which condensed their plot 
into a number of area and shape but did not give more details 
about its attributes in terms of location, slope etc. (Interview 
with DU). Thus in a large number of cases, “experiences are 
not perceived as injurious; perceptions do not ripen into 
grievances; grievances are not voiced to the city” (Felstiner et 
al 1980) even though the planning exercise may have been 
unfair. From the meeting minutes we can see that even if 
landowners approved at time of pooling, grievances could be 
born later – for example, when they couldn‟t construct as 
much as their neighbours because their plot was allocated in 
a lower density precinct. 
 
What then leads the situation into a stage where claims are 
made to the city committee? Deconstruction of conflict is a 
complex process that is beyond the scope of the study which 
is concerned with only one slice of it – the legitimacy claim. 
This is analysed in two parts. First what is the framing used 
to bring an individual case onto the meeting discussion 
agenda - on what grounds is an issue framed as a grievance 
against the rules?  Second, what are the strategies used to 
justify a remedy especially when it overrules the original rule. 
This is strategic action at play, using a variety of tactics, of 
which “framing” is prominent. The channel used to express 
the claim also matters in ordering the urgency of the claim.  
Loopholes in policy design & enforcement  
Claim-makers use a variety of framings to de-legitimize a rule. 
These were possible because loopholes in the rule design 
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create the ripe conditions for actors to exploit. The following 
examples are an illustration of flaws in rule design.  
i) Conflicts and gaps in rules 
The legitimacy of a codified rule can be challenged if a given 
rule is in conflict with another rule of the plan itself or the 
rules of another organization. For example, the Land Act 
2007 has a minimum ceiling of 10 decimal for plot 
transaction in order to limit subdivision, “The minimum  
parcel  of  land  that  shall  be registered in a Thram is 10 
decimals” (RGOB 2007: 35, point 132). However, after land-
pooling of 30%, plot owners with an initial holding of 10 
decimal go under the ceiling and would not get permissions to 
construct or transact. Therefore, they approach the 
authorities and make claims for an exception (Meeting 2, 
Agenda 13). Although it seems fair to make an exception for 
such a case, it technically contradicts a clause of the Land 
Act: “Upon acquisition, if the remaining land parcel is less 
than 10 decimals, such and both in Thromde and rural areas 
shall also be acquired”. (RGOB2007: 38, point 150).  
 
Sometimes, there can also be a gap in the rules and the 
planner has no direction on how to proceed further. An 
example is the request from plot owners below the hospital 
JDWNRH (Hotel Rignam line) to change their precinct to a 
higher density precinct (from UV-II, MD to UV-I) in order to 
increase the building height (Meeting 9, Agenda 12). They 
claimed that their plots had been designated as a commercial 
area in the 1992 urban development plan, prior to the 2004 
building regulations codified in the DCR. Their legitimacy 
claim was that they had been paying commercial tax rates all 
this while. 
ii) Conflicting authority of various government bodies 
A second reason for why a claim arises is when a given rule is 
challenged by the authority of another government body or 
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official, usually by a letter of approval or some other form of 
assent. One such case was the request from an individual to 
waive off his penalty for regularization of illegal structures 
inside his premise. Although he did not have a formal 
building approval, his claim was that he had got verbal 
approvals from the previous mayor to construct kitchen and 
toilet (Meeting 8, Agenda 1).  
 
Frequently, intervention comes from the Cabinet as and when 
there are special projects to be implemented in a given area of 
the city, example Chubachu circle. The Attic Rules 2009 were 
also abolished after direct approval from the Prime Minister. 
Recently, the National Environment Commission (NEC) has 
vetoed a component of the plan which proposes an auto-
mobile workshop in the north of Thimphu.   
 
Sometimes overruling by the court on a personal dispute case 
affects land allotment (Meeting 2, Agenda 12). Generally 
however, the courts have played a minimal role as most 
landowners do not take their disputes to the courts except 
some high profile ones. This maybe because traditionally in 
Bhutan, local level disputes have been solved by the 
decentralized level of government. Before 1969, the district 
officer was the Dzongpon (dzungpa) and the governance 
format was such that both administrative as well as judicial 
powers rested with the local government.  Courts have played 
minimal role in influencing TSP because despite a landmark 
judgement on July 13 in 2003, in which land pooling was 
declared illegal, it continues,. The courts said that land 
pooling had no legal base as government does not have the 
right to take private property without compensation (Dorji 
2003a). However Land pooling continues to be practiced in 
the city on grounds that it is obtained with consent from the 
landowners (Norbu 2014).  
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iii) Implementation feasibility is questionable 
Here the claim is that rule is not feasible or not conforming to 
the practices of the people, thus making it difficult to monitor 
or control. It was one of the framings used to abolish the Attic 
Rules 2009 allowing conversion of non-habitable attics into 
full floors (Meeting 3, Agenda 16). Similarly, it was observed 
that the space between the plot and road under the RCC slab 
was being used for habitable purposes so the head of IMS, 
DCD put it up for discussion claiming that it was becoming 
difficult to control (Meeting 3, Agenda 15). 
iv) Logic of the rules is disputed on grounds of fairness/utility  
Here the claimant will provide a framing that questions the 
logic or “efficiency” of the rule. Plot owners for instance have 
challenged the way the plan has categorized and 
distinguished areas by precinct density. For example, one 
owner wanted to construct in her apple orchard (convert her 
precinct from E-4 precinct to UV-II MD). As she was 
persistent, her claim was represented by the planner, and 
was framed in his technical logic “the plot is accessible to 
road and the topography is very gentle” (Meeting 7, Agenda 5). 
Or the landowner tries to rationalize, “even if the land is 
pooled it will be of no use to the government” (Meeting 7, 
Agenda 6). 
 
On another instance, the plot owners themselves take on the 
role of the planner to judge the geographical attributes of 
their properties. “The plot owners are of the view that there is 
hardly any difference in terms of topography and soil texture 
between UV-1 and theirs which are located in the same 
locality” (Meeting 7, Agenda 4). Their claim was that they 
contributed the same percentage of land pooling, and yet they 
are disadvantaged due to restriction in floor height so the 
claim was to either reduce their land contribution or increase 
precinct density (converting from  UV 2-II to UV 2-MD).  
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6.2 How veto players challenge the rules 
Once claim-makers identify the framing to challenge the 
legitimacy of a given rule, they have to choose a format to 
express that claim. The channel used to express has a 
consequence on the final decision. So the “facts of the case” 
include not only the content of the claim but also how the 
claimant voices his/her claim. If a landowner for example 
refuses to consent to land pooling, (s)he may end up stalling 
the plan35, thereby increasing the sense of urgency for the 
planner to address the claim. There are at least five strategies 
that are observed from the sample of claims. While presenting 
how veto players challenge the rules of the plan, this section 
also provides an idea of the resource endowments of actors 
that leverage their claim-making powers. 
i) Appealing/Petition 
Usually when landowners appeal to the city authorities, they 
do it in an individual capacity. But increasingly one finds that 
people have started to form small groups from within the 
community. These groupings are very small for example 18 
plot owners in Changbangdu (Meeting 7, Agenda 4), 15 
owners in Upper Taba. The tactics used are usually framing 
and bargaining. Examples of bargaining include paying 
betterment charges instead of land pooling, or increasing 
building height and reducing plot coverage and vice versa.  
 
Appealing is obviously more likely to be successful when 
people do it as a group instead of as individuals. But 
sometimes if an individual‟s status is high enough, just a 
word will do to get the mayor and the planning team 
brainstorming on how to address the claim without breaking 
                                              
35This is a case where 100% pooling is required (initially in the ADB, 
WB funded LAPs) 
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the rule. Thus coming from well-known elite families would be 
able to command immediate attention.  
ii) Dissenting & stalling the plan 
This is when landowners refuse to cooperate and not give 
their assent to the land pooling agreements. One landowner, 
who had the maximum land in Taba (and hence was at stake 
to lose most from the land pooling contribution), did not sign 
the agreement (Meeting 6, Agenda 3). Another 15 also were 
not in accord (Kuensel). As a result the Upper Taba LAP could 
not be finalized and got delayed until the city authorities 
finally conceded by taking betterment charges instead of land 
contribution. “The main reason for the consideration was if … 
(plot owner‟s name)… does not sign the land pooling 
agreement, then the LAP cannot be implemented even if there 
are donors willing to fund the LAP.” (Meeting 6, Agenda 3). 
Another case was of a plot-owner refusing to show up for site 
visit even after two notifications because he did not want to 
comply with a court decision of subdividing his land (Meeting 
2, Agenda 12). 
 
This power is certainly greater for larger landowners because 
their land pooling contribution makes available a larger 
amount of land for the city.  
iii) Bypassing municipal authority 
Here the strategy of the claimant is to simply bypass the 
municipal authorities and approach another, possibly higher 
government body. There was a case, when the building 
inspector informed an individual that he did not have a 
formal approval to build his attic as an extra floor and hence 
the structure was illegal and construction should be stopped, 
“the inspectors were counter-informed that the approval 
process is underway in the Ministry of Works and Human 
Settlement. In the light of awaiting the anticipatory approval 
by competent authorities, it has become a practical difficulty 
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for the TDM inspectors to refrain the property owners from 
constructing illegally.” (Meeting 3, Agenda 16). 
 
The Land Commission (NLCS) is the most frequent intervener. 
With an expansion of the mandates of the Land Commission 
since 2007, plot owners often beseech the Land Commission 
on the unfairness of land pooling and then Land Commission 
forwards a claim to the city officials on behalf of the 
landowner (Kuensel). In other cases, it challenges some of the 
decisions already taken by the planner on its own accord 
(Interview 10/01/2014), hence introducing a new set of 
claims from the point of view of the Land Act.  
 
Surely one‟s social network is a key resource here. The more 
people one knows in the government, the more likely his/her 
ability to have an access point. However, as we have seen, the 
planner can also be a representative. So all landowners do 
have access to the state, but not all may have access to senior 
level bureaucrats in the Ministry for example.  
iv) Encroaching anyway  
Finally, there is a silent36 way of claim-making. This is by not 
actively demanding for an exception but just going ahead and 
doing it. This is at the landowner‟s risk for it may lead to a 
situation where the city authorities will demolish the 
structure. At the same time, it can also work the other way – 
the option to pay a nominal fees for regularization. An 
example is of a plot-owner who was supposed to make a land 
pooling contribution of 12.67% but by the time the planner 
got to the stage of plan approval, the plot owner‟s plot was 
fully developed with retaining wall all around her plot. Finally 
the decision was ruled in her favour by taking betterment 
charges instead of land contribution (Meeting 9, Agenda 8).  
                                              
36 Silent encroachment?  
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6.3 How municipal officials authorize deviations 
The last two sections explained the different types of claims 
used to challenge the legitimacy of a given rule. Moving on 
from how claims entered the agenda, we now try to 
understand why they were accepted. Since most claims were 
accepted, we focus on how deviations were legitimatized - 
invoking what values? Further, what strategies were used to 
secure the legitimacy of these deviations? The table shows 
that most claims tend to be accepted by the court of the 
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There are two main ways in which claims for plan deviation 
can be accepted. First by authorizing a single case of 
exception and second, by altogether revising the rule. The 
decision-taker is the Thimphu City committee comprising of 
elected members. The aim in this section is to deconstruct 
certain values invoked in the committee‟s “language of 
justification” (Baldwin 1955: 47) as well as strategies to 
secure the legitimacy of the deviation. Once the deviation has 
been authorized, the transformation is complete. What was 
formerly a rule violation is now the new codified norm. Thus 
strategic action in the TCC “field‟ contributes to the 
transformation of the urban planning “field” basically by de-
codifying original rules and codifying new norms.   
Authorizing an exception 
Invoking alternative legitimacy claims: Framing 
The reasons why it is acceptable to authorize an exemption 
vary. An analysis of different legitimacy claims made is 
summarized below: 
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i) Public mandate  
Decisions can seek legitimacy in public opinion, “it was 
observed that it is more benefitting to the general public to 
have a full floor rather than attic” (Meeting 3, Agenda 16). 
“Many land owners have approached Thromde with the 
request to allow them construct on plots with less than 25 
decimal” (Meeting 7, Agenda 1). 
ii) Precedence  
Legitimacy can be sought in a precedent even if it breaks the 
rule. In one case, most of the 14 plots in a protected river 
buffer zone were already developed and the remaining two 
were seeking permission to develop. In such a case, the 
legitimacy claim involved equal rights for all which was 
ordered above the importance of rule compliance. The 
decision was that “special consideration should be made for 
the two remaining plots to develop like others”. However, to 
reduce guilt for authorizing building in an ecologically 
sensitive zone, it was decided that more trees should be 
planted in the area to protect the river eco system (Meeting 6, 
Agenda 4). 
iii) Self-Blaming  
Sometimes, the reason is that the fault lies with the 
government, not the people. “The house decided that it was 
the weakness on the part of the Thromde for not completing 
the property assessment to charge the above taxes and 
therefore it was unfair to charge the taxes let alone penalties” 
(Meeting 4, Agenda 9).  
iv) Democratizing exception-making  
Deviation becomes legitimate so long as exemptions are made 
for all cases equally. For example, in the proposal of 
betterment charges in lieu of land pooling, the committee said 
that all issues in one area should be submitted together 
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rather than case by case basis (Meeting 9, Agenda 6). Or to 
create an inventory for example of all the plots smaller than 
25 decimal in E-4 areas (Meeting 6, Agenda 14) or plots 
falling under traditional village settlement. By processing 
approvals for an inventory of cases, justification can be 
sought in the fairness of making exceptions equally.  
v) Other plot owners are not affected 
(Meeting 6, Agenda 3) “After a brief deliberation the council 
approved the submission based on the fact that the land 
pooled would not affect the overall plan of the local area” 
(Meeting 9, Agenda 8). This is the utility argument. If a rule 
deviation does not cause any harm, then what is the harm in 
accepting a claim?  
 
Securing legitimacy of a deviation: Conditional Bargain  
The main strategy to authorize an exception is striking a 
conditional bargain i.e. the city authorizes landowner to 
violate the original planning code in exchange for or under 
the conditions of something else. Framing of course is at the 
Traditional Village in Babesa 
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heart of how and why claims are considered legitimate to be 
accepted but this was already covered in the last section. This 
part focuses just on one way how a deviation is legitimized, 
particularly if the formal channels for rule revision are not 
feasible to pursue. This is more relevant to individual 
exception making rather than general issues considered for 
policy revision. This is to regularize a structure in exchange 
for some conditions. By doing this the interaction becomes a 
conditional bargain between the state and its citizens. This 
creates the security that rules are being followed.  
 
The strategy here is trading rights: regularizing a structure in 
exchange for penalty fees. Pardoning land contribution in 
exchange for betterment charges. A typical bargain is to 
increase building height but reduce coverage (Meeting 5, 
Agenda 5). For example, change category of precinct to 
increase building height but allow only G+ 3 constructions 
with 50% coverage, creating a new combination altogether of 
the TSP-DCR (Meeting 9, Agenda 12). Another example is to 
accept claims for precinct change but modify the land pooling 
percentage (Meeting 7, Agenda 5). 
 
The E4 precinct mandates a minimum of 25 decimal size of 
land. There was an instruction from the Cabinet to permit 
land transfer for plot size between 10 to 25 decimal but on 
condition that the applicants would not ask for extra land 
from the government in the future (Meeting 4, Agenda 16). 
 
Following this, the Land Record Section proposed that DCR 
should be reviewed so that irrespective of land size, 
construction and transaction might be allowed. In this way, 
sometimes, individual cases build up to generate a rule 
change or shift in policy. This is the substance of the next 
section.  
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Revising a rule 
The basic analysis is that the members want to show that 
whatever decision is taken, it is not personally motivated as it 
comes up quite frequently in the discussions that the 
committee does not want to set the wrong precedent and 
avoid the trouble with similar claims in the future (as said by 
Executive Secretary in a meeting). However, many times the 
decision-makers also double up as claim-makers. This can 
happen when a people‟s representative puts up a case for 
discussion. So the committee is sympathetic and often 
looking for a legitimate way to authorize the request for 
exemption. In order to disown it as a case of personal 
discretion, the strategy is to outsource it to other legitimate 
sources of authorities. This section provides some concrete 
examples of how this is done.  
i) Framing: Invoking religious significance 
The Buddhist religion and culture are deeply preserved in 
Bhutan and even the Plan (TSP) respects the sanctity of 
religious structures. This means that if a new road meets a 
religious structure (such as a lakhang, prayer wheel etc.) on 
its way, the road pays its respects by diverting its path. In an 
informal discussion, a property owner joked with me saying 
that if anybody wants to avoid land pooling or road cutting 
through their property, the best strategy is to build a small 
religious structure (Discussion on 28/03/2014). He shared 
an example of developments near the Sunday vegetable 
market which supposedly left a religious structure 
untouched.  
 
Moving to a concrete example of strategic action: a high 
status monk was acquiring property where some government 
land was already encroached upon by the previous owner. 
The issue during the process of his application was that the 
Land Commission would not accept his land transaction 
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request if there are structures encroaching on government 
land. The committee decided to regularize the structure (a 
garage) by saying that it is (or will be? – not clear) used as a 
“prayer house/temple”. The concerned division then 
proceeded with NLCS to regularize occupied excess land. An 
added justification was that the area occupied is small 
(Meeting 2, Agenda 6).  
ii) Gathering evidence:  outsourcing to knowledge expert  
A “feasibility study” is the classic way to put a request under 
consideration. An example is the request of 19 property 
owners to reduce the penalty fees for regularizing their illegal 
structures. They had approached the mayor complaining 
about the biases in the penalty which was not in proportion 
to the illegal portion of their structures. Similarly, when the 
issue of taking betterment charges in exchange of land 
pooling was first brought up, it was decided that “A 
Betterment Charges Committee/Land Acquisition Committee 
has to be instituted” (Meeting 9, Agenda 6). 
 
Making an “inventory” of all cases when one case is looking 
for an exception is another strategy. Deviation becomes 
legitimate so long as exemptions are made for all cases 
equally. For example, in the proposal of betterment charges in 
lieu of land pooling, the committee said that all issues in one 
area should be submitted together rather than case by case 
basis (Meeting 9, Agenda 6). Similarly, it was decided to 
create an inventory of all the plots falling under Traditional 
Village precinct. 
 
This is the pre-stage of evidence gathering, before proposals 
can be put to the Ministry for change. After compiling the 
inventory of all plots in E-4 area below 25 decimal, TCC 
wanted to put up a proposal to the Ministry to consider the 
possibility of allowing such plots some construction with 
coverage from 20% to 30% (Meeting 6, Agenda 14; Meeting 7, 
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Agenda 1). E-4 is the precinct for Agriculture based 
Environments. Because it is characterized by very steep 
slopes, the TSP had proposed that instead of developing 
buildings, it is better used as orchard / green house or 
agriculture for farm food processing and research.   
iii) Approaching higher authority/overruling 
Just like claim-makers, the TCC committee too seeks to 
secure legitimacy for its decisions by getting the assent of a 
higher authority. Sometimes the institutionally designed path 
is followed; for example, propose evidence-based rule 
revisions in the DCR (Meeting 9 Agenda 10).  But sometimes, 
just like claim-makers, TCC too uses the tactic to bypass the 
assigned authority (in this case, MoWHS) and gain the assent 
of higher authorities. For example, to convert the attic into an 
additional floor, TCC sought the approval from the Cabinet 
(Meeting 3 Agenda 16). This is a proposal that the Ministry 
was surely not going to agree on for it changes the entire 
density and population plan of TSP by adding one more storey 
to all buildings across the city area. 
  
Outsourcing decisions to another authority is also a strategic 
way to disown responsibility for a decision. An example is to 
entertain a request by a plot owner who wanted to pay 
betterment charges in lieu of land pooling. Some members 
were not in favour as they felt that the pooled land may be 
necessary to set up a transformer station by the Bhutan 
Power Corporation (BPC). The decision was to write to BPC 
and if they did not require space provision for transformer 
then to accept the plot owner‟s request (Meeting 7, Agenda 6). 
In a future event, this would secure the municipal decision of 
criticism by outsourcing responsibility to BPC.  
iv) Revising rule to make a deviation legal   
Finally and this is the last step to secure the legitimacy of a 
deviation – codify it. The TCC does not have policy making 
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powers but it does have the power to modify rules and 
regulations. Although we don‟t see its policy-agenda setting 
role when we look only at formal documents, there is, on 
digging deeper, a layer upon layer of revisions in internal 
letters and circulation orders which revised the rules codified 
in the original Thimphu Structure Plan (TSP) 2003 and 
Development Control Regulations (DCR) 2004. Some examples 
of new addendums to the DCR include a) Narrow Plot 
Guidelines 2011 b) Minimum plot size after subdivision 2012 
c) Abolishing Attic Rules 2009. Betterment charges instead of 
land pooling is slowly becoming an institutionalized practice, 
for example by codifying the Betterment Charges “criteria” 
and forwarding it to NLCS for their information (Meeting 9, 
Agenda 16). There are also the revisions to the Local Area 
Plans. But these are numerous and even the planner does not 
have a good record of the changes preceding his tenure.  
 
Currently, DCD is in a process of evidence collection and 
getting together its proposals to revise the whole DCR into a 
second version.  Some of the changes we can expect to see 
will be on the Traditional Village concept. Which area should 
fall under traditional precinct is being discussed and finalized 
and DCD was required to comes up with the number of 
traditional houses in different locations. Then there are the 
basements (Interview 17/02/2014) – to allow these to become 
habitable, since already they are receiving request from 
snooker bars and parking is not feasible in all basements.  
 
And then there are the river buffer zones – some committee 
members are already pondering to make them developable. 
During the course of a discussion on the plot of an ex-
Minister which falls in the buffer zone, issues began to be 
raised about the general concept of the buffer. Members 
debated “whether the buffer is indeed necessary for a stream 
which has no source but is fed by the overflow of a nearby 
power plant. Further some members suggested that the buffer 
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rule should be reviewed and accordingly introduce buffers for 
river, stream and spring category so that precious land is not 
lost and is being prevented from being beneficial for only few 
people residing near such buffers” (Meeting 15, Agenda 2). 
Notice the subtleness of this process – reason for putting 
buffer zones into the agenda is that only rich people are 
benefitting from it so the legitimacy claim is to spread the 
benefits. In the process, the planning rules evolve. 
 
We can also see changes in related “fields”. After the attic was 
abolished and all buildings gained an additional floor, a rule 
conflict was created with an existing rule – where all buildings 
with more than four floors must have lift provision. Using the 
framing that for a standard plot size, lift cannot be provided 
as the allowable coverage (40%) is just enough for living space 
– a new claim entered the agenda. The choices debated by the 
committee were a) either to do away the lift requirement for 
residential building even if it is four storied and above or, b) if 
the lift provision has to be kept, the coverage be increased by 
1.9-2%. After lengthy deliberation, it was agreed to have lift 
provision for more than 4 storied and increase the coverage. 
This was also an opportunity to discuss another DCR related 
rule – set-back provision of 5m – whether it should or not be 
maintained. It was decided to flag this as an agenda for 
review during the overall DCR revision (Meeting 6, Agenda 
11). 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter showed that no matter what the constraints of 
the system, actors can find a way around them. The plan is 
not working partly because there are genuine issues in the 
rules and partly because when the plan challenges an actor‟s 
interests, he or she can use “strategic action” to manoeuvre 
around the rules. This was true of both claim-makers and 
decision-takers. This chapter showed different strategies and 
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framings used by each to challenge the original planning 
codes. For example, land pooling requires up to 30% 
contribution from all plot owners in a given Local Area Plan 
(LAP). This contribution is not monetarily compensated but 
the state provides access to roads and other infrastructure. 
But what if one plot owner has already invested and has 
access to a road. Should he too give up his land in the same 
proportion as his neighbours? These are some of the issues 
the come up during plan implementation. When claim-
makers identify a rule conflict, they frame their claim in such 
a way that the legitimacy of the original code is challenged. In 
response, the town committee tries to address each grievance 
and it too finds a way to legitimize its actions of exception-
making. Some of the rationales used by them was that the 
claim was public mandate or followed a wrong precedence set 
before. Quite frequently, when an exception is made for one 
plot owner, then an inventory is compiled of similar cases in 
order to make exceptions on a uniform basis. In this way, 
there is a diffusion of the exception-making process and some 







This study looked at the case of urban planning in Thimphu, 
capital city of Bhutan to explain why the spatial organization 
of a city cannot be determined by codifying rules in a city 
plan. In the introduction, we saw that that although over ten 
years have passed since the Cabinet of Ministers approved 
the Thimphu Structure Plan 2003-27, the plan has not been 
able to achieve the outcomes for which it was designed. It 
proposed to keep 70% of the peri-urban areas, incorporated 
into the municipality in 1999, as open and green areas. It 
also anticipated the growing problem of affordable housing 
and proposed to build low income housing units where new 
land was available through land pooling contributions. And 
finally, the plan promised to tighten building regulations to 
preserve traditional architecture. However, the outputs on all 
of these commitments have been poor. Keeping this context 
as the starting point, the study analysed the implementation 
stage of the policy cycle to understand why planning rules 
had not been implemented.  
 
To answer the question why there was a lack of compliance to 
planning rules, we started with two hypothesis a) policy misfit 
and b) veto players, derived from the literature in the 
emerging domain of “Sociology of Compliance”. The former 
predicts that the higher is the incompatibility between a 
policy and norms of the prevailing institutional environment, 
lower is the policy compliance.  The veto hypothesis predicts 
that the higher is the number of veto players in opposition to 
a given policy, the lower is the level of policy compliance. 
 
Like in a sociological study of any subject, this literature on 
compliance is also symptomatic of the “agency vs structure” 
divide. The “actor-agentic” perspective highlights the role of 
actors (veto players) in diverting the objectives of a policy or 




behaviour. In contrast to this is the “institutional-
structuralist” tradition (misfit). This argument is that actor 
behaviour is itself regulated by norms of the broader society 
and hence some written or unwritten rules guide social 
action.  
 
In order to use insights from both sides in the agency vs. 
structure debate, the study adopted Fligstein and McAdam‟s 
theoretical framework of “strategic action fields”. A field can 
be conceptualized in various forms: a network, a policy 
domain, a market or even an organization.  
 
This study took an organizational definition and the field in 
focus was the municipal corporation, which is the main 
implementing authority of the plan. The study constructed a 
network of actors/organizations interacting with municipal 
officials on matters relating to plan implementation. This 
network, including the municipal corporation and all other 
actors who influenced and co-produced the policy, was 
termed the policy governance field. Thus the field universe 
was composed of the city corporation as the locus field and its 
interacting counterparts. The locus field was internally 
divided into sub fields (bureaucratic divisions vs elected 
committee). At the same time, the locus field was also 
embedded in a larger network of organizations (Bhutanese 
bureaucracy). This framework makes analysis useful by 
breaking up the abstract macro structure or field universe 
into multiple “fields”, each field being the site for “strategic 
action” and at the same time, each field being embedded in 
the broader “field environment”. This visualization thus 
captured the agency of actors to negotiate rules within a given 
field (e.g. urban planning) and at the same time see that 
actors‟ agency was constrained by the rules of the larger field 
environment (state bureaucracy).  
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In other words, we could see that municipal officials had 
some freedom to go around the rules codified in the urban 
plan but their negotiation powers were constrained by 
broader relations of governance in Bhutan. As the 
municipality was in a relation of dependence, other actors 
frequently undermined its authority to govern the plan.  By 
using the field framework, the study could therefore capture 
how control over municipal policy-making differs and is 
reflected in spatial developments in the city. The next section 
presents a summary of findings and revises the hypothesis.  
7.1 Findings: Why don’t rules work in Thimphu? 
Veto pressures: deviating the rules away from the plan 
We saw that there are several pressure points pushing for 
deviation from the plan, even inside the implementing 
authority, which we could discern after breaking the TCC as 
an organizational “field” into sub-fields. For example the 
bureaucrat-run divisions tended towards compliance but the 
elected town committee tended towards grievance-redressal, 
with greater flexibility in rule application. The approach to 
deconstruct the insides of the organization is inspired by the 
micro-politics approach of Crozier-Friedberg. While their work 
emphasizes the role of actors, here the argument is that the 
identity of field players derives from their field position which 
is institutionally-determined. This is also indispensable to 
understand actor‟s interests before they go on to be 
articulated into strategic action.  
 
Chapter III emphasized that TCC‟s relations with other 
government bodies were of dependence so orders from above 
are constantly undermining the authority of the plan. Veto 
players in Thimphu are not the same as in other cities but 
they are there. Whereas in many cities today, we find that the 




policy agenda, this is not the dominant trend in Thimphu. 
There was virtually no interaction between TCC and the 
infrastructure investors, which may be because private sector 
development has remained stunted in Bhutan. This also 
impacted city planning because without private players 
stepping to lease land from the municipality, most 
neighbourhood nodes remained vacant and hence vulnerable 
to encroachment of individual residential plots.  
 
Landowners, who in many Asian city contexts have been 
displaced through exercises of urban planning and urban 
renewal, are actually a powerful veto group in Thimphu. Two 
examples provide convincing evidence. In Upper Taba a 
petition by a small group of affected landowners stalled the 
plan for almost 6 years. In 2003, a group of landowners sued 
the municipality and won the case. The High Court ruled in 
their favour and said that land pooling is illegal. The fact that 
landowners in Thimphu are a strong veto group also has to 
do with their resource endowments and status in society. 
There is a sizeable overlap between voting power, land 
ownership and senior positions in government. So veto 
players are present but of a different kind - not the usual 
private sector investors but citizens who command elite 
status. The main interest of landowners is to maximize the 
exchange value of their properties and least in the 
development control objectives of the plan.   
 
Instead of market players, financial institutions funding 
infrastructure have played a much more important role. Their 
interest lies more in ensuring that the land acquisition 
process is through landowner consensus and less in how the 
building codes are followed during implementation. Their role 
has further leveraged the bargaining power of landowners 
during the land readjustment process.  
 
Thimphu’s Growing Pains 
120 
 
The fact that state-society relations are so individualized and 
state-market interactions are conspicuously absent is specific 
to Bhutan. This is because the governance network field is 
embedded within the broader state field. The type of state 
development processes in Bhutan structured how state-
society, state-market and intergovernmental relations are 
structured in the first place. Collective action is a very 
controlled process, for example an organized street protest is 
not a dominant mode of strategic action. But one-on-one 
negotiation between state and citizens is prevalent in the 
repertoire of strategies that actors use for claim-making (see 
also Pain & Dema 2003). Is this a neutral process? Is 
exception-making open to everybody equally? This is a 
question open for debate. 
Structural determinacies: Predictability in rule deviation 
When we zoom out of specific situations and look at how 
decision-making in the municipal committee is working, we 
can find some contradictions. On one hand, the city 
committee is very committed to adjudicating individual cases 
scrupulously. It takes great efforts to conduct feasibility 
studies, make inventories etc. There are recurring references 
to how the wrong precedent must not be set implying that 
rules need to be followed no matter who the claim-maker is. 
But at the same time, we cannot deny that the process was 
characterized by some gaping indeterminacies. One could 
question, why not conduct a feasibility study for all the 
claims that come? Why reject some? If one sits through these 
meeting discussions long enough, one will be able to identify 
a pair of cases in which the claim was very similar but the 
decision completely opposite. For example, there was a 
request that deficit area of a landowner, which disappeared in 
the cadastral survey, to be considered as his land pooling 
contribution (Meeting 6, Agenda 7). While this claim was 
rejected, there were some other claims which the city 




solution without breaking the rules. See Meeting 15, Agenda 
2 for an example on how the whole Local Area Plan was 
modified through plot reconfiguration so that the claimant 
could get what he claimed; now is it just incidental that the 
claimant was an ex-Minister? 
 
So the question that we are asking is, that even though there 
is no blatant bias in exception-making by the committee – 
after all majority of the claims have been accepted – and even 
through the committee is very concerned to operate “within 
the rules”, it finds a way out, when it needs to. There was 
indeed a very strong commitment to not set the wrong 
precedents and follow the rules. And yet, there is a direction 
to where plan deviations are headed. We can already predict 
that the next edition of the DCR will be more property-
developer friendly, allowing landlords to maximize values from 
their properties – be it by permitting habitable uses of the 
basement, or by allowing buildings with lifts to increase 
coverage, or maybe even permit some construction in the 
buffer zones. What is it about the workings of this policy field 
that the decision-making is so indeterminate (no clear basis 
for exception-making) and yet so predictable? This brings us 
back to the discussion about what intervenes between a 
policy‟s objectives and its outcomes; what ultimately 
predominates – actors or larger structures of society?  
Intermediating factor – actors or institutions? 
This study showed that certainly actors intervene with their 
goals/interests using a given repertoire of strategies. The 
argument was that through strategic action, the constraints 
of the rules of a field can be avoided without actually 
breaking the rules and while perverting the outcomes. This is 
because when actors do not want to comply - and this 
happens if they do not see the rule as worthy or legitimate 
enough to be complied with – then they find ways and means 
to go around it. However, society doesn‟t exist as vacuum; it 
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is created through actor interactions so it is actors who are 
actually doing the work of intermediating and diverting the 
outcomes from objectives of rules. But the question is, are 
they agents representing something else? Is there a larger 
force that is reproducing prevailing power relations and 
shaping exception-making to favour the already powerful? 
The argument here is that just because actors have the 
agency to intervene does not mean that they have the 
autonomy. They remain embedded in a larger field universe 
and the path of their “strategic action” is determined to some 
extent. It was argued here that actors are twice embedded in 
the field universe.  
  
First, by their position in the policy governance network (field 
network). This field position defines what their goals and 
interests are in the first place. Relations among actors in the 
policy field network is organized by the state. Therefore, an 
individual actor‟s interests are not determined from vacuum 
but very much a product of what roles the institutional design 
has for them. For example, within the TCC, the interests of 
the bureaucrat for rule compliance vs. the interests of the 
elected representatives for rule revision is very much a 
function of their field positions. Therefore, studies that have 
emphasized the role of actors without looking at how these 
actors are embedded in the larger institutional framework 
have not identified the source from where the interests of 
actors are born. 
 
The second type of embeddedness is social positions. Social 
position is very bluntly defined here but the idea is that each 
individual is embedded in her/his personal network of social 
relations. This personal network is a vital source of 
information and hence the key channel through which 
cultural frames of interpretation are transmitted to 
individuals. It mirrors the pattern of resource endowments in 




strategic action. First, it tells them whether a given rule 
challenges some other norm of their world. If it does, only 
then do they go about finding a suitable strategy to challenge 
the rules. Strategic action involves how to frame the rule as 
illegitimate (the reason they give to the committee is not the 
actual reason they want to avoid the rule – it is just a 
framing). Social position is what guides actors‟ interpretation 
of social reality, informing them of the do‟s and don‟ts of 
Bhutanese culture, and the type of framings that are 
available in the repertoire of legitimacy claims to challenge 
the authority of the plan.  
 
At the same time, social networks also provide useful 
connections with government officials that one can approach 
when s/he needs to bypass the concerned authorities. 
Sometimes, social networks (e.g. family relations) even 
determine occupation and hence social attributes - If one 
comes from an important family, their chances of holding 
government positions and being the elite is also high. This is 
especially true in Bhutan where corruption is not present in 
the form of bribery as in India but pervasive in the form of 
nepotism and favouritism. In short, social networks are 
conceived here as resource endowments. And resource 
endowments leverage possibilities for strategic action. 
Therefore, actors‟ agency in strategic action is structured by 
their social positions in at least two ways a) information on 
type of legitimacy claim and b) repertoire of strategies 
available. At any given point some strategy is always available 
for all but the well resource-endowed just have more options. 
For example, all have access to the state and can approach 
municipal authorities with a grievance but only some have 
the option to bypass municipality and appeal to a higher 
authority like the Ministry.  
 
 




We go back now to revisit the two hypotheses. What is that 
intermediating variable that distorts a rule‟s outcome from its 
objectives? Is it rational and political behaviour of actors as 
the hypothesis about veto players? Or is it a misfit between 
the rules of the policy and existing norms? Both hypotheses 
are validated but modified.  
 
Misfit – What was the misfit? What was the plan expecting 
that diverged from the social realities of this place? It is 
argued that the misfit is not in the aspirations of the plan 
design. In fact, in terms of its objectives, the plan is very well 
aligned with Bhutan‟s national policy of “Gross National 
Happiness” (GNH). Just like GNH, the Thimphu city plan 
seeks to balance growth with preservation of nature and 
heritage. So it is certainly not a case of policy misfit. But 
there is another type of misfit – between legal codes and 
social norms.  
 
The misfit is that the plan judges all properties on the basis of 
their geographical attributes without regard for the social 
attributes of property owners. This is a misfit because it 
treats everybody equally whereas in practice this is not so.  
The social relations that prevail as the norm is that some 
have more privilege than others. However, privilege cannot be 
comprehended by the legal codes of the plan. Social norms 
are therefore not in line with the legal codes. Therefore, the 
misfit is not in the content of the policy but its conception of 
society and relations between actors.  
 
The plan treats all relations as defined by the field network. 
All landowners are assumed to have the same relation with 
the municipal officials. But in practice this is not so. In 
sociology, there is a concept called “multi-vocality”37 or the 





idea that one actor can have multiple positions and identities 
at the same time. This study showed that while holding 
his/her field position, the actor also holds a social position. 
So a plan that governs actor relations only by considering 
field positions and neglecting social positions is going to fail. 
Because relations between landowners and municipal bodies 
is not the same when an ex-Minister is the claimant vs. 
someone else. Another example of a misalignment between 
social norms and legal codes is that while the municipal 
corporation is the implementing authority of the plan, there 
are other types of authorities that trump municipality‟s 
authority because the norm is that this organization is low in 
the hierarchy vs. the Ministry and other central agencies.  
 
Veto player – Veto player hypothesis is also confirmed and 
the veto players in Thimphu‟s case are the landowners 
seeking to maximize property values. We saw that 83% of 
Thimphu‟ residents live in rented housing, 62% of which is in 
the private sector. Much of the new building stock is thus 
being built for rented housing.  
 
It was argued that strategic action is a function of both 
resource endowment as well as negotiation powers. Therefore, 
those better endowed with resources were better placed to 
negotiate. Those who are well-connected had strong 
negotiation powers to bargain the rule. They set the agenda 
on which rules will be modified. Once the decision to revise a 
rule is taken, the exception-making is diffused to other levels 
of society who are not as well-endowed; one example of this is 
paying betterment charges in lieu of making a land 
contribution. This was first proposed by a member of National 
Council and gradually it came to be universally applied. So 
we could see that everybody is capable of some amount of 
strategic action and in that sense everybody is a bit of a veto 
player. 
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The conclusion is that rules don‟t work because actors 
intervene as agents but they are not autonomous from the 
larger social structure and power relations (components of the 
field universe). Both hypotheses (veto and misfit) are 
confirmed for the question why rules don‟t work: but 
modified. Rules are not followed because there is a misfit - 
not in the content of the policy but in its conception of 
society; the plan is very much in sync with Bhutan‟s GNH 
ideology of growth balanced with nature and culture. The 
misfit is that the plan regulates all properties based on their 
geographical attributes whereas governance in the city cannot 
be disconnected from the social attributes of property owners.  
The veto player hypothesis is confirmed but modified to say 
that everybody is a bit of a veto player and strategic action is 
not restricted to the domain of resource-endowed actors 
alone. Actors and their choices for strategic action remain 
embedded in the larger Bhutanese society, they have the 
agency to change parts of it like in the urban planning case. 
At the same time, their actions are also regulated by the 
broader norms of Bhutanese society. 
7.2 Contribution: Busting three common myths 
The study is very useful to understand dynamics of rule 
compliance.It may not tell us how to generate rule compliance 
but it explicates what wouldn‟t work and why. The section 
below identifies three counter-intuitive findings which may 
guide policy makers to be better prepared for implementation 
challenges.    
Policy contribution: lessons for compliance 
i) Rule clarification will not guarantee more compliance 
Weber had argued that with modernization, the bureaucracy 
becomes more rational. This rationalization process involves a 




are created for specialized functions. Indeed, a greater 
division of labour is evident in Bhutan‟s modernization 
processes. Bhutan‟s democratic transition in 2008 was 
accompanied by organizational reforms. New organizations 
and new laws were created superseding previous ones. 
Although, the intuitive idea would be that such a 
rationalization of the bureaucracy increases its efficiency, 
according to the findings of this study – this idea is not 
validated. The rationalization process (more rules, 
specialization of organizations) cannot guarantee “efficiency” 
from the point of view of compliance because it will create 
more rule conflicts, more authority conflicts, which is 
precisely what strategic actors thrive on.  In fact, the more 
rules you create, (which comes as a package with the 
rationalization of bureaucracy) the higher is the probability of 
rule conflicts and hence higher the probability of strategic 
action to exploit the loopholes in the system. With 
rationalization and expansion of bureaucracy, we may think 
that rule enforcement will improve. But it can also decrease 
effectiveness from a compliance point of view. This is because 
each new organization is concerned with its own goals as a 
priority which may affect implementation in other fields. The 
Land Commission for example, orders the rules of the Land 
Act above the rules of the Thimphu Structure Plan. Thus rule 
clarification will not guarantee more compliance because it 
will create more room for discretionary decision-making. 
ii) Even if rules don‟t work, they have a second order value  
This is a simple point. Just because rules don‟t work 
sometimes, it does not mean they are entirely redundant. 
They have secondary functions and can serve an alternative 
purpose. Even if rules are not successfully implemented, they 
may kick-start a process of change in norms. The plan has 
done exactly this in the minds of the bureaucrats 
implementing the plan. Since the plan treats all properties 
equally without regard for who is the owner of the property, 
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some of the implementing staff has also adopted this attitude. 
In my field trip of three months where part of the time was 
spent in direct observation sitting in the municipality, I 
noticed that some of the officials identified themselves as the 
“Aam Aadmi Party”, in reference to the changing politics in 
New Delhi. Their message was that rules should be applied 
consistently to all, without exceptions for those who are more 
powerful such as officials in senior government positions. 
This mentality is also percolating among the landowners. 
Even the landowners are slowly realizing that they can‟t 
always get away with their claims and have to go through a 
series of protocols. So rules can have democratizing 
tendencies even if they are not applied equally to all.  
iii) Unintended consequences cannot be avoided 
The norm shift initiated by rules in one field can also spill 
over to another. The current democratic shift in the 
Bhutanese state field, for example, has created a sense of 
entitlements which can see building up in the urban planning 
field. We saw that a given field is embedded in a complex 
network of other fields. Events in one field spill over into 
another, just as Fligstein and McAdam predict. Once we 
understand just how complex the universe of fields is we can 
see why strategic action in other fields is spilling over and 
coming as exogenous events in this field. So the exogenous 
influences in any given field cannot be avoided. This 
exogenous influence is not some invisible force of power or 
gravity as in some conspiracy theory. It is basically strategic 
action in another field that has come to this field in the form 
of events and changing circumstances, i.e. actors in the form 
of events. When change of circumstances affects the field in 
focus, then these become opportunities or constraints that 
strategic actors have to negotiate with. As they exploit the 
loopholes in a given field, it further leads to more strategic 
action which spills back elsewhere in the field universe. 




constructed here, so at the root or core are actors and actions 
but it expresses itself in the form of change in rules or 
institutions. So yes actors create institutions as the Michel-
Crozier thesis, but not at one scale. But at the same they are 
also constrained by the rules of the broader field universe. 
Even the most resource-endowed actors have are limited in 
the large scheme of the universe to how much change s/he 
can initiate.  This study‟s development on the nature of 
“structure” allows us to understand why unintended 
consequences are simply inevitable due to action of actors in 
other fields - very different conception of structure from a 
broader supernatural force at power like capitalism or 
neoliberalism. There may be tendencies for such forces to be 
reproduced because they get institutionalized in many fields 
and work in favour of actors with resource endowments but 
this force does not just exist – it is embodied in actor-
institution interactions.  
Academic contribution 
Theoretical contribution: Field framework.  
Having applied Fligstein‟s framework to a new empirical 
study, we are now in a position to assess it. In general, the 
framework works really well to explain both embeddedness 
and the ability of actors to transcend the rules of the field 
(distinguished from rules of the universe) because it separates 
the field from the broader field environment.  
 
The main contribution of this study to Fligstein‟s framework 
is developing a bit more on the relations between a field and 
its environment by trying to understand how exactly is a field 
embedded in the larger order. Although their work recognizes 
the embeddedness of actors, Fligstein & McAdam‟s concepts 
are designed primarily for a theory of social action so it is 
more agency-oriented.  
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The main contribution of this research is therefore to develop 
more on the “structuralist” angle of their framework. The field 
universe metaphor was proposed to replace the Russian doll 
one because it captures better the complexity (webs/galaxies) 
of fields in which a given field is embedded. It also allows us 
to zoom in and out, maintaining the importance of 
perspective in understanding interests of actors. This 
visualization also gives us a better grasp of change and 
stability in the field universe which is in a constant state of 
flux as each field is undergoing dynamic change from internal 
pressures of actors and their strategic action. By changing 
the constitution of a given field, actors also change the 
constitution of the universe, just as Fligstein had suggested. 
But when we zoom out, we can see that despite so much 
agency and change dynamics, the overall structure of the field 
universe is really the same and tends to persist. Even as new 
fields pop up like stars and some disappear from the night 
sky, the milky way looks the same.  
 
Although extremely useful, the Theory of Fields is still young. 
By providing the metaphor of looking at a field as just a small 
star or planet or system of planets in the field universe, we 
can start to think about the complex ways in which a field is 
organized in its environment. We can also think more about 
interaction at levels other than the usual macro-meso-micro 
by thinking of networks organized at varying intermediate 
levels of the universe in which they are embedded. Scale is 
important because by seeing just how small a field is in the 
vast field universe, we can begin to see why change can be so 
blindingly bright if we zoom onto a given field. But when we 
zoom out, strategic action dims and stability of institutions 
can be better grasped. There is also a misfit in field positions 
and social positions. Everybody is not embedded in social 
networks of the field universe in the same way. They have 




metaphor is in conceptualizing different scales and 





Contribution to urban studies 
Going back to Jennifer Robinson, what value can we draw 
from this research for urban studies? For comparative 
Russian Doll: Fligstein‟s visualization of a field and its 
environment 
The Universe: This study‟s visualization of field structures 
Thimphu’s Growing Pains 
132 
 
research, this framework of fields allows us to see all cities as 
ordinary because in all cities, new fields are being 
institutionalized at a given point. Field population may be 
higher in an older field universe i.e. with a longer history of 
formal institutionalization, but new fields are emerging all the 
time.  
 
One concrete research path is to compare actor interactions 
in new fields that are forming across the globe. For example, 
today in Europe there is a lot of talk about financing green 
infrastructure and in Asia new models of financing mass 
transit projects– both are about institutionalizing new models 
of financing infrastructure. These are the kind of comparative 
criteria we could try to identify to honour what Jenny 
Robinson was saying. How to find new criteria for comparison 
or common points in studies of the global north and south 
instead of distinguishing them on stereotypical attributes. 
The concept of fields is very useful to do just that. We can 
compare some common property of a field e.g. change, 
stability, relations with field universe and so on to get some 
fresh insights on social change in diverse contexts. For 
research we have thus discovered new criteria for 
comparison: field properties. 
7.3 So what? Lessons for the way forward 
Lesson for policy transfers across contexts 
More generally, the lesson is that, those interested in 
transferring policies across contexts have to pay attention to 
the age of institutionalization of a given policy field, at a later 
age more in sync with codified norms but at an early stage, to 
find a goodness of fit with prevailing social norms which are 
not yet reflected in codified form. We saw that urban planning 
is a very young policy domain in Bhutan. We also saw that 
over time, some planning rules also got revised to fit the 




field matures, there may be convergence between social 
norms and legal codes. Based on this hypothesis, we can infer 
that when governments and international development 
partners seek to transfer policies from one context to another, 
they can improve the “goodness of fit” of their policies with 
the prevailing institutional architecture in either of two ways. 
At a mature stage of a given policy field, more attention 
should be paid to goodness of fit with prevailing legal codes. If 
a policy field is still new for the given context, compatibility 
should be sought between norms of the new policy and 
prevailing social norms which are not yet reflected in codified 
form. This is because at a later age, a policy field is likely to 
be more in sync with codified norms but at an early stage, 
legal codes will not sufficiently reflect the norms of that place. 
Improving compliance through consultation 
For the policy maker, compliance is successful when the rule 
has been internalized. No rule can be a silver bullet, it gives 
some rights but takes others. Even the plan, which has many 
fair practices, is taking away private property through land 
pooling without compensation. Hence any rule is always 
vulnerable to a legitimacy crisis. For a rule to be successfully 
implemented, it needs to be internalized. Legal socialization 
can increase its perceived legitimacy. Legal socialization can 
be even more important than finding a cadre of honest 
officials. Staffing alone cannot guarantee compliance because 
if members don‟t see a rule as legitimate, they will find their 
way around the rule in a legal way. In Bhutan there is a very 
strong distinction between who makes the policy (Ministry) 
and who implements it (Municipality). This has its own 
reasons, such as technical expertise and so on. However, at 
the end of the day, it is very important for the rules to be 
internalized. It is not what is legal but what is legitimate that 
ultimately matters when actors choose to escape the rules of 
the system.  
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One way to increase perceived legitimacy of the rule is 
consultation. If it is not feasible to consult all stakeholders in 
the governance network, then consulting at least the 
implementing authority is essential. Currently in Thimphu 
policy-making and implementing functions are segregated – 
this creates more issues of compliance.  Had the ministry 
involved the implementing authority & mayor from the 
beginning, the city corporation would have more incentive in 
complying. In my fieldwork, I observed that those who had 
been part of the planning team since its inception (Senior 
Planner in the Ministry and Chief of Urban Planning division), 
were also the most interested in ensuring that the original 
rules of the TSP were complied with. By virtue of their 
involvement in the policy design process, they also became 
the watch guards during plan implementation.  Participation 
is important not only because it makes the process 
democratic, but it also gives lawmakers a sense of ownership 
which that may generate compliance as implementers are 
more likely to believe in it. The local area planners want to 
follow the rules but they have a micro perspective and more 
concern with landowner consent than green spaces; besides 
length of the document, they haven‟t even read the full thing. 
So the only watch-guards of the overall plan are those who 
made it. 
7.4 Conclusion: Taking a pragmatic approach to 
policy 
To arrive at the final recommendation of this study, we go 
back to John Dewey‟s pragmatic approach to public policy. 
His message was that policy makers should stay open to 
adjusting policy goals in the course of implementation as new 
knowledge and experience is continuously gained. This study 
reinforces his view because of the opinion that there is no one 
right path for policy success. It all depends on what the 












Judging whether a policy is “efficiently” implemented depends 
on what the objective is. If the goal is compliance then policy 
success in Thimphu‟s case calls for a tough stand from the 
Source: Hotel 
Jumolhari website 
Is Thimphu a city for tourists? Hotels dominate Thimphu‟s city centre.  
Clock-tower square: The only open space left in the city centre. 
My interview with a former mayor (24/02/2014) revealed that a 
strong lobby was opposed to the plan to keep the clock-tower 
square open and construction-free. 
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state, with no regard for individual grievances. If the goal is 
participatory planning, then rules will need to adapt as 
unfairness in rule design is discovered even if it compromises 
the original policy vision. If the goal is faster implementation, 
then more power needs to be devolved to implementing 
authorities. But this could result in a lack of oversight, which 
in the past has resulted in unfair allocation of land (Tshering 
2002).  
 
At the end, this is a debate the people of Bhutan must have. 
We should recall that although this study highlighted the 
remarkably high levels of negotiation between state and 
society, citizen consultations have been limited only to the 
landowning class despite the fact that the resident majority is 
formed by tenants. So a broader definition must be used, 
when we say the people of Thimphu should decide what they 
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Annex: Precinct categories   
No. Precinct Category          Description 
1 UV-1 Urban Village Core   
High  -  density, 
residential 
2 UV-2 (MD) Urban Village Periphery  
Medium - density 
residential 
3 UV-2 (LD) Urban Village Periphery  
Low - density 
residential 
4 UV-3 Urban Village Enclave  
Bagos & unplanned 
settlement 
5 TV  Traditional Village  
Precincts of Traditional 
Villages  
6 UC  Urban Core  
Town center, a precinct 
of trade and commerce  
7 UH  Urban Hubs  
To be created in the North and 
South of Thimphu as major 
entertainment, transport and 
shopping precincts   
8 
NN  Neighborhood 
Nodes   
Convenience shopping, basic services 
and amenities precincts for the Urban 
Villages  
9 I  Institutional  
Local, National and International 
Institutions  
10 H  Heritage Precincts  Scared places of historical importance  
11 D  Dzong Precinct  
National  icon,  a  symbol  of  His  
Majesty  the  King  and  His  Holiness 
the Je Khempo  
12 
G-1  National Open 
Green Spaces  
Precincts of national importance such 
as a national sports complex, archery 
ranges, and exhibition areas, etc.  
13 
G-2  Green Space 
System   
Public assets like parks, gardens, and 
recreation areas   
14 
E-1  Environmental 
Conservation 
Enhancement and protection of fragile 
ecological zones  
15 
E-2  Forest 
Environments  
Preserves in the “no development 





E-3  Agricultural 
Environments   
Paddy lands, flood plains, farming 
activities 
17 
E-4  Agriculture based 
Environments  
Very  steep  slopes,  orchards,  green  
houses,  for farm food processing and 
research 
18 
SSIC  Satellite Service 
& Industrial Centres  
Industrial, heavy maintenance, 
wholesaling and warehousing 
19 M  Military  Related to national security 
20 R  Royal Uses  Related to Royal uses  
21 
EN  Endowment for  
Future  
Land whose use determination is 
deferred to future generations 
22 
CP  Urban Corridor 
Precinct  
A corridor of land 44 meters wide 
running through the city 



























Annex: Thimphu City Corporation Organogram 








Source: TCC, UPD no date: 15 
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Annex: Precinct Plan 




Annex: Principles of Intelligent Urbanism 
Source: Extracts from the TSP (MoWHS 2004: 4-11) 
 
Balance with nature: Intelligent Urbanism proposes that the 
balance of nature can be maintained when fragile areas are 
reserved as preservation, conservation, or as low intensity 
habitation precincts. 
 
Balance with tradition: Every  culture  and  every  society  
has  its  iconography,  its  signs  and  its  symbols.  Intelligent 
Urbanism  promotes  their  incorporation  into  the  spatial  
order  of  urban  settings.  
 
Conviviality: Intelligent Urbanism sponsors a convivial 
society. Vibrant societies are interactive, socially engaging and 
offer their members numerous opportunities for gathering… 
through design, such units of social space. 
 
Efficiency: It promotes medium to high-density residential 
development along with complimentary social amenities, 
convenience shopping, recreation and public services in 
compact, mixed-use settlements.  These compact communities 
have shorter  pipe  lengths,  wire  lengths,  cable  lengths  and  
road  lengths  per  capita. 
 
Human scale: Intelligent Urbanism promotes the scale of the 
pedestrian moving on the pathway, as opposed to the scale of 
the automobile on the expressway. 
 
Opportunity matrix: Intelligent Urbanism views the city as an 
opportunity system.  It sees the city as playing an equalizing 
role allowing citizens to grow… For example, it does not judge 
a “bago” as blight on society. It sees the possibility that such a 
settlement may be an opportunity channel for entry into the 
city! Such a settlement may be the only affordable shelter, 
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within easy access to employment and education, for a new 
immigrant household in the city. 
 
Regional Integration: Planning of the city and its hinterland 
is a single holistic process...With thoughtful planning the region 
can take pressure off of the city… There are many activities 
within the city, which are growing and are incompatible with 
urban habitat. Large, noisy and polluting workshops and 
manufacturing units are amongst these. Large wholesale 
markets, storage sheds, vehicular maintenance garages,  and  
wood  working  mills  need  to  be  housed  outside  of  the  
city’s  limits  in  their  own  satellite  enclaves. 
 
Balanced Movement: Intelligent  Urbanism  sees  movement  
and  transport  in  the  city,  and  in  the  city  region,  as  a  
balanced group of systems that are integrated with one 
another. These overlapping systems or modes of transit include 
pedestrians, cycles, automobiles and buses.  
 
Institutional integrity: Intelligent Urbanism envisions the 
institutional framework as being very clear about the rules and 
regulations it sponsors … There  must  be  a  Cadastral  
System  wherein  all  of  the  land  in  the  jurisdiction  of  cities  
is demarcated, surveyed, characterized and archived, 
registering its legal owner, its legal uses, and the tax defaults 
against it…Intelligent  Urbanism  is  not  naïve!  It recognizes 
that there are developers and promoters who have no long term 
commitment to their own constructions, and their only concern 
is to hand over a dwelling, gain their profit and move on. For 
these players it is essential to have Development Control 
Regulations, which assure the public that the products they 








Annex: Occupations of Thimphu Residents 
Main occupation  Freq Percent 
      
road laborer 3,263 10.8 
security personnel 2,191 7.3 
motor vehicle drivers 1,704 5.6 
occupation not classified 1,659 5.5 
weavers, pap, bowl making 1,556 5.2 
miners, stone cutters, carving 1,323 4.4 
retailer 1,185 3.9 
household chores, maid, baby sitter 1,173 3.9 
business professional 1,167 3.9 
carpenter 1,141 3.8 
clerks, keyboard operating clerks, secr 1,024 3.4 
administrative management 766 2.5 
farming 763 2.5 
school teachers 761 2.5 
financial accountant 693 2.3 
watchman, guard 686 2.3 
engineers, architects 656 2.2 
computer professionals 558 1.9 
mechanic 511 1.7 
health supervisors, assistant, nurses & 507 1.7 
housekeeping, sweeper 505 1.7 
occupation not stated 433 1.4 
program managers, general managers etc. 423 1.4 
gelong, gomchhen, anim 403 1.3 
painter, lhadrip 403 1.3 
cashiers, teller clerks 395 1.3 
electrical equipment fitters 380 1.3 
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chhampoen (dancer), tseepem (singer) an 252 0.8 
tailor 236 0.8 
tourist guides, ushers 211 0.7 
livestock health professional 203 0.7 
store keeper, ticket seller 201 0.7 
contractors excluding logging 188 0.6 
auditor 179 0.6 
market oriented crop & livestock raisin 177 0.6 
receptionists 168 0.6 
government executives 167 0.6 
assistant engineers, support engineers 165 0.6 
goldsmith 129 0.4 
library science, social science & infor 123 0.4 
plumber 120 0.4 
mathematicians/statisticians 118 0.4 
logging contractor 118 0.4 
chain operator 115 0.4 
messenger, porter, & related worker 112 0.4 
pavement vendors (doma, cloth etc.) 104 0.3 
beautician, barber 79 0.3 
thrimpoen, thrimrap, jab-mee 76 0.3 
human & animal doctors 73 0.2 
lamas, lopens, rimpochhe 66 0.2 
welder 57 0.2 
lecturers in college, institutes 55 0.2 
customs, taxing related professionals 53 0.2 
no skills 52 0.2 
printing/binding, paper product worker 41 0.1 
food manufacturing workers 40 0.1 




meet (makhep), cheese, butter seller 27 0.1 
blacksmiths 27 0.1 
teachers of shedra, non-formal and other 23 0.1 
cobbling & cleaning services 21 0.1 
cattle herder 21 0.1 
safety quality inspectors 18 0.1 
post mail delivery man 19 0.1 
tseep (astrologer) 15 0.1 
fashion, models, characters 14 0.1 
metals, chemical, other plant machine  12 0.0 
sawmill laborer 13 0.0 
dungtsho, menpa 10 0.0 
building construction finish-ups 6 0.0 
garbage collectors 5 0.0 
physicist, chemists related professional 4 0.0 
business agents, brokers 4 0.0 
potters 3 0.0 
mining, mineral processing plant operat 2 0.0 
heavy machine, locomotive engine operat 3 0.0 
transport laborer, freight handler 3 0.0 
power production & related plant operat 1 0.0 
      
Total 30,190 100 
 
 
